South Carolina Law Review
Volume 72

Issue 1

Article 9

Fall 2020

The Elitification of the U.S. Supreme Court and Appellate
Lawyering
H. W. Perry Jr.
University of Texas at Austin

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
H. W. Perry Jr., The Elitification of the U.S. Supreme Court and Appellate Lawyering, 72 S. C. L. REV. 245
(2020).

This Article is brought to you by the Law Reviews and Journals at Scholar Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in South Carolina Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholar Commons. For more information, please
contact digres@mailbox.sc.edu.

Perry: The Elitification of the U.S. Supreme Court and Appellate Lawyeri

THE ELITIFICATION OF THE U.S. SUPREME COURT
AND APPELLATE LAWYERING

H.W. Perry Jr.*
I.

INTRODUCTION ..................................................................................... 246

II.

THE ELITFICATION OF THE SUPREME COURT BAR .............................. 247

A . OralA rgumen t .............................................................................. 24 8
B.
C.

Certiorari ...................................................................................... 2 5 6
Growth of the Elite Supreme Court Bar........................................257

III. THE RISE OF SPECIALIZATION IN PRIVATE APPELLATE PRACTICE.......258
IV. APPELLATE ADVOCACY BY GOVERNMENTS ........................................ 263

A.

B.
V.

The Solicitor General of the United States ................................... 263
1. Changes in the Solicitor General's CourtParticipation........266
2. Change in CareerPatterns .................................................... 267
Elite Litigatorsfor States: The Rise of State Solicitors General...267

ELITFICATION: MORE EVIDENCE, MORE QUESTIONS ......................... 275

A.
B.
C.
D.
E.
F.
G.
H.

The Private B ar............................................................................. 277
United States Office of the Solicitor General................................281
State Solicitors General................................................................284
Th e J ustices................................................................................... 2 87
The Justices' Views on Elitism ...................................................... 289
Criticisms of Elitism ...................................................................... 29 1
Control over Agenda Setting ......................................................... 293
Elitism and Democracy................................................................. 297

VI. ELITE LEGAL MOBILIZATION ............................................................... 298

A.
B.

Mobilization Within the Private Bar ............................................. 300
Mobilization Within and Among State Governments .................... 301

V II. CO N CLU SIO N ........................................................................................ 3 03
* Associate Professor of Law and Associate Professor of Government, The University of
Texas at Austin. I am grateful to many people who read the paper or gave me helpful comments
when I presented aversion of it or discussed it with them. There are too many to list individually,
but special thanks go to Jeffrey Abramson, Lynn Blais, William Blake, Dan Brinks, Minette
Drumwright, John Dzienkowski, Zach Elkins, Willy Forbath, Mark Graber, Gary Jacobsohn,
Patrick Keyzer, David Klein, Sandy Levinson, Marin Levy, Kevin McGuire, Scot Powe, Ernie
Young, and Lei Zhang. Thanks also for comments from my colleagues in the Law School when
I presented it there, and from the law and Ph.D. students in my seminar. I especially thank
Christine Bird for her excellent work as my research assistant and for her many substantive
suggestions. I also thank Allen Sumrall for his contributions. Christine and Allen are destined
to become great scholars.

245

Published by Scholar Commons,

1

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 72, Iss. 1 [], Art. 9
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

246
I.

[VOL. 72: 245]

INTRODUCTION

Developments in law and judicial behavior receive much attention from
legal academics, political scientists, and other scholars of law and courtsdevelopments in lawyering, not so much.' Over the last two decades,
significant developments in lawyering in the United States have gone
unnoticed by many, or at least have not received the attention they deserve
from academics. These developments involve appellate advocacy. First, there
has been a dramatic change in who argues before the Supreme Court.2 Second,
significant changes have taken place with regard to appellate advocacy in the
private bar.3 Finally, considerable changes have occurred in appellate
advocacy in both federal and state governments. 4 These separate
developments are important by themselves, but their convergence magnifies

their effects. Taken together, these changes have implications that go far
beyond lawyering. They have resulted in a dramatic "elitification" of U.S.
Supreme Court and appellate advocacy. They are also spawning a new sort of

legal mobilization. This Article documents these changes, demonstrates that
they are related, and argues that their confluence is important and deserves
more attention and study.
In other areas of law and politics, scholars pay much attention to those
who attempt to influence decision makers. 5 That same attention is not found
when it comes to the relationship of appellate lawyers and courts. Appellate
courts have long been understood to play a significant role in our society
beyond simply functioning as courts. While obviously important in our legal
structure, what they do comports with the two most famous definitions of
politics: "the authoritative allocation of values" 6 and "who gets what, when,
how."7 Appellate courts-especially the Supreme Court-authoritatively
allocate values, and they decide who gets what, when, and how. Scholars
almost always focus on the Justices and judges rather than the lawyers.
Appellate advocates, however, play an important role in those outcomes. 8
1.
See generally LEE EPSTEIN ET AL., THE BEHAVIOR OF FEDERAL JUDGES: A
THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL STUDY OF RATIONAL CHOICE 65-99 (2013) (reviewing

empirical
2.
3.
4.
5.

literature studying judicial behavior). But see sources cited infra note 14.
See infra Part II.
See infra Part III.
See infra Part IV.
See, e.g., HAROLD D. LASSWELL, POLITICS: WHO GETS WHAT, WHEN, HOW 3

(1950).
6.
7.

DAVID EASTON, A FRAMEWORK FOR POLITICAL ANALYSIS 50 (1965).
LASSWELL, supranote 5.

8.

For an example of work showing the importance of oral arguments and their influence

on the developments of the law, see TIMOTHY R. JOHNSON, ORAL ARGUMENTS AND DECISION

MAKING ON THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 125 (2004) (asserting that the Justices use
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Thus, appellate advocacy deserves more and broader scholarly attention,
especially in light of the significant changes that have occurred and converge.
This Article proceeds in seven Parts. Part II documents the "elitification"
of those who argue before the Court from the private bar-individuals and
law firms-and recounts how this came to be. Part III discusses changes in
the private bar more generally and links these changes to those discussed in
Part II. Part IV focuses on government lawyers-federal and state-who
argue in the Court and describes significant changes that have occurred. Part
V digs deeper into the concept of elitification of the Supreme Court. Part VI
examines changes in elite legal mobilization. Finally, Part VII offers some
concluding thoughts.
II.

THE ELITIFICATION OF THE SUPREME COURT BAR

The study ofpolitics is the study of influence and the influential.9
HaroldLasswell
In 1993, Kevin McGuire wrote a path-breaking book entitled The
Supreme CourtBar: Legal Elites in the Washington Community.1 0 This book

detailed the nature and importance of the Washington legal elite, particularly
focusing on elite lawyers appearing before the Court." McGuire's arguments

are even more relevant today as a small elite group of lawyers has come to
dominate advocacy before the Court.1 2 The extent to which this occurs often

comes as a surprise except to those who follow the weekly happenings at the
Court such as law firms with Supreme Court practices, a few Supreme Court

oral argument to gather information); RYAN C. BLACK ET AL., ORAL ARGUMENTS AND
COALITION FORMATION ON THE U.S. SUPREME COURT

9.

10. KEVIN T. MCGUIRE, THE
WASHINGTON COMMUNITY (1993).

11.
12.

3-4

(2012).

LASSWELL, supra note 5, at 3.
SUPREME

COURT

BAR:

LEGAL ELITES

IN

THE

Id. at 47.
Id. at 30.
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journalists, or some of us Supreme Court junkies.1 3 With some notable
exceptions, elitification has not been the focus of much scholarship.' 4
A.

Oral Argument

Throughout much of modern history, it was very rare for a private lawyer
to have the chance to argue before the Supreme Court, and if one were so
lucky, it usually would have been just once. How things have changed. The
story now is one of "repeat players."' 5 For example, in October Terms 2013
to 2019, Paul Clement argued thirty-two cases. In one term alone (OT15), he

argued six cases, and two terms earlier (OT13) he argued five cases.1 6 Not far
behind was Neal Katyal who argued twenty-four cases in the same seven
Terms. He, too, argued six cases in one term (OT16) and argued four in
OT15.1?

13. I have given presentations on this topic to law and political science faculties. Most
scholars were unaware of how dramatic the elitification has become, if they were aware of the
issue at all. It is well known to some Supreme Court watchers mostly journalists and bloggers.
See, for example, the work of Tony Mauro and Marcia Coyle in The NationalLaw Journal,
Adam Liptak in the New York Times, or Nina Totenberg with National PublicRadio. For an
extended discussion of this topic, see Joan Biskupic et al., The Echo Chamber, REUTERS (Dec.
8,
2014,
10:30
AM),
http://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/scotus/
[https://perma.cc/D46T-2BZ9]. SCOTUSblog provides a daily update on the Court that includes
discussions of the players. It also provides excellent statistics compiled by Kedar Bhatia and
now Adam Feldman. Adam Feldman's blog provides extensive data about the Supreme Court
often over a longer time horizon. EMPIRICAL SCOTUS, https://empiricalscotus.com/

[htups://perma.cc/FE2V-NFFH].
14. Few academic articles focus on who argues before the Court and its elitification. I
discussed the importance of elite counsel, as well as counsel who were not highly regarded,
which was reported to me in interviews with the Justices and their clerks. H.W. PERRY
JR., DECIDING TO DECIDE: AGENDA SETTING IN THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT

127 (1991). As noted, Kevin McGuire wrote a book about the legal elite and continued his work

on the topic in subsequent articles. See, e.g., Kevin T. McGuire, Repeat Playersin the Supreme
Court: The Role ofExperienced Lawyers in Litigation Success, 57 J. POL. 187-88 (1995). Law
professor Richard Lazarus wrote a seminal article on this topic, which is discussed in more detail
throughout this article. Richard Lazarus, Advocacy Matters Before and Within the Supreme
Court: Transforming the Courtby Transformingthe Bar, 96 GEO. L.J. 1487, 1490 (2008). Adam
Feldman, in addition to his blog, has also examined this topic in a scholarly paper. Adam
Feldman, Who Wins in the Supreme Court? An Examination of Attorney and Law Firm
Influence, 100 MARQ. L. REV. 429, 430 (2016). Allison Orr Larsen and Neal Devins draw on
these and other works and add their own data as they focus on the changing role of amici. Allison
Orr Larsen & Neal Devins, The Amicus Machine, 102 VA. L. REV. 1901, 1903 (2016).
15.

Marc Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of

Legal Change, 9 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 95, 97 (1974).
16. See infra Table 1.
17. See infra Table 1.
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From the 2013 Term to the 2019 Term, the Court heard 465 cases that

had oral arguments.1 8 Only nine private lawyers accounted for 157 of the
arguments in those cases!'

9

In percentage terms, those nine lawyers argued in

over one-third of all cases that had oral argument. 20 The top twenty private
lawyers appeared in more than half of the cases. 21 A mere forty-four private
attorneys made 323 arguments. 22 In percentage terms, these private repeat

players appeared in almost 70% of all cases argued during these seven
Tenns. 23 Table 1 lists all private lawyers that argued three or more cases
between 2013 and 2019. In addition to these lawyers, an additional thirty-eight

lawyers argued twice while 232 lawyers made only one appearance before the
Court. Repeat players have become the norm. 24

&

18. I collected data as follows. I started with the Supreme Court Database for the 20132019 Terms, to identify the cases with oral arguments. See Harold Spaeth et al., The Supreme
Court Database, WASH. UNIV. L. (Sept. 13, 2019), http://supremecourtdatabase.org/data.php
[https://perma.cc/DES5-7VLM]. For the 2019 Term, I used the Supreme Court's Granted
Noted Cases List. See Granted& Noted List: October Term 2019 CasesforArgument, U.S. SUP.

CT. (July 9, 2020), https://www.supremecourt.gov/orders/19grantednotedlist.pdf
[https://
perma.cc/EAB3-U42F]. Between these two sources, I compiled a list of docket numbers for a
total of 576 cases across the Terms. However, several cases were companioned and collapsed
into one oral argument. This removed fifty-five cases from the total. Forty-nine cases had no
oral arguments for Terms 2013-2018. With the onset of precautions surrounding COVID-19,
several cases originally docketed and granted oral argument for 2019 Term were rescheduled.
Twenty-four of the eighty-five cases docketed for 2019 did not hold oral arguments. My
calculations show that for the seven Terms examined, there were 465 cases with oral argument.
I then went to Supreme Court docket sheets to code the identity of the attorney delivering oral
arguments in the cases. Much of my data maps on to those reported by Bhatia in his impressive
SCOTUSblog's stat pack. Stat PackArchive, SCOTUSBLOG, https://www.scotusblog.com/refer
ence/stat-pack/ [https://penna.cc/F4Q2-56SN]. Our numbers differ at times because we are
comparing slightly different things, or we may treat something differently such as how we
consider two cases when they are combined for a single opinion. I also wanted to collect data on
a more extensive list of attorneys than he reports. His data are invaluable as a starting point for
any researcher. However, I derived my data as described above and look at the data over several
Terms rather than as Bhatia does focusing on each Term individually. I also cross-referenced
my collection with the Oyez database of oral arguments. See About Oyez, OYEz,
https://www.oyez.org/about [https://penna.cc/9T3W-CRYX].
19. Throughout this Article, the term "private lawyers" refers to nongovernment lawyers.
20. See infra Table 1.
21. This does not mean that the lawyers made 50.54% of all arguments. Rather, it means
that they argued in half of the cases. Every case has arguments made by two sides, doubling the
number of total arguments, and in some cases more than one lawyer argues for each side
especially when the Office of the Solicitor General participates. The government is often granted
additional time to argue as an amicus, though this is rare for private counsel.
22. See infra Table 1.
23. See infra Table 1.
24. See Biskupic et al., supra note 13.
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Table 1. Oral Arguments by Private Counsel

25

October Terms 2013-2019
Oral

Running

Percent Running

Arguments

Total

Total

Paul D. Clement

32

Neal K. Katyal

24

32
56

6.88%
12.04%

Jeffrey L. Fisher

18

74

15.91%

Seth P. Waxman

16

90

19.35%

Thomas C. Goldstein
Kannon K. Shanmugam

15
15

105
120

22.58%
25.81%

David C. Frederick

14

134

28.82%

Carter G. Phillips

12

146

31.40%

Shay Dvoretzky

11

157

33.76%

E. Joshua Rosenkranz

9

166

35.70%

Daniel L. Geyser

9

175

37.63%

Adam G. Unikowsky

9

184

39.57%

Paul W. Hughes

8

192

41.29%

Lisa S. Blatt

7

199

42.80%

Paul M. Smith

7

206

44.30%

Gregory G. Garre

6

212

45.59%

Michael B. Kimberly

6

218

46.88%

Christopher Landau

6

224

48.17%

Christopher G. Michel

6

230

49.46%

Attorney

Andrew J. Pincus

5

235

50.54%

Danielle Spinelli

5

240

51.61%

Peter K. Stris

5

245

52.69%

Michael A. Carvin

4

249

53.55%

Marc E. Elias

4

253

54.41%

James A. Feldman

4

257

55.27%

Mark C. Fleming

4

261

56.13%

Douglas Hallward-Driemeier

4

265

56.99%

Allyson N. Ho

4

269

57.85%

William M. Jay

4

273

58.71%

Erin E. Murphy

4

277

59.57%

Theodore B. Olson

4

281

60.43%

Mark A. Perry

4

285

61.29%

25. The tern "Running Total" refers to the total number of arguments made by that
attorney and those who preceded him or her in the table. So, for example, Clement, Katyal, and
Fisher argued seventy-four cases combined. The term "Percent Running Total" indicates that of
the 465 cases with oral argument, Clement, Katyal, and Fisher argued in 15.91% of them.
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25

October Terms 2013-2019
Oral

Running

Percent Running

Arguments

Total

Total

Kevin K. Russell

4

289

62.15%

Eric Schnapper

4

293

63.01%

Stephanos Bibas

3

296

63.66%

John J. Bursch

3

299

64.30%

Catherine M.A. Carroll

3

302

64.95%

Erwin Chemerinsky

3

305

65.59%

Thomas H. Dupree Jr.

3

308

66.24%

John P. Elwood

3

311

66.88%

Miguel A. Estrada

3

314

67.53%

Noel J. Francisco

3

317

68.17%

Jonathan D. Hacker

3

320

68.92%

Donald B. Verrilli Jr.

3

323

69.56%

Attorney

Attorneys with 2 Arguments
Attorneys with

1 Argument

38
232

Despite the influence repeat advocates wield, apart from a few names,
most repeat players on this list are likely unknown to students of the Supreme
Court-whether political scientists, sociologists, historians, or law professors.
It is not only an issue of name recognition, scholars and the public know little
about these lawyers' social, economic, or political networks. 26 Generally,
scholars of power who study other institutions are keenly aware of important
players' names and other information about them, particularly when these
players attempt to influence decision makers. 27 This is not so for lawyers
before the Court.
To realize how staggering these numbers are, one must recall how rare it
was for any given private counsel to appear frequently before the Court in
years past. 28 In the 1980 Term, fewer than 20% of private counsel had

appeared before the Court previously. The rest were first-timers. 29 Of those
20% repeat players, none came close to the number of arguments by today's
key players: Paul Clement with over 100 cases (many in private practice),

26. But see McGUIRE, supra note 10, at 28-46.
27.

See LASSWELL, supra note 5, at 3.

28.

See Lazarus, supra note 14, at 1492; see also John G. Roberts Jr., OralAdvocacy and

the Re-emergence ofa Supreme CourtBar, 30 J. SUP. CT. HIST. 68, 75-76 (2005).

29.

Roberts, supra note 28, at 75.
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Carter Phillips with eighty-eight cases (most in private practice), Thomas
Goldstein with forty-four cases, and Lisa Blatt with forty cases. 30
The increasing "elitification" of those practicing before the Court has
been a trend for a while. In 2004, then-Judge Roberts-now Chief Justice
Roberts-gave a lecture addressing the increased attention to appellate
advocacy in the private bar generally but focusing particularly on the U.S.
Supreme Court.31 He opened the lecture by saying, "[o]ver the past
generation, . . there has been a discernible professionalization among the
advocates before the Supreme Court, to the extent that one can speak of the
emergence of a real Supreme Court bar." 3 2
Chief Justice Roberts used the term "re-emergence" in the title of his
lecture because in the early days of the Court, there were a handful of wellknown and frequent advocates, like Daniel Webster and William Pinkney. 33
In the 1814 Term, for example, Pinkney argued half of the Court's cases. 3 4
That phenomenon ended. In modern times, most repeat players were
government lawyers from the Office of the Solicitor General, with a few
exceptions from the private bar.3 5 Today, several lawyers from the private bar
are now prominent repeat players, as Table 1 shows.

The evidence Chief Justice Roberts presented about a revitalized Supreme
Court bar came not only from his own experience as one of the elite group of
lawyers appearing with some frequency before the Court but also from
empirical work done for the lecture. 36 He compared the 1980 and 2002
Terms.3 7 Looking at private attorneys in the 1980 Term, he found that "fewer

than [20%] of the advocates had ever appeared before the Supreme Court
before."

38

By contrast, in the 2002 Term, over 44% of appearing lawyers were

repeat players. 3 9 Chief Justice Roberts then went on to examine what he called

30. See supra Table 1.
31. Roberts, supra note 28, at 80.
32. Id. at 68. It is important to understand Roberts' use of the modifier "real." He meant
those who actually practice before the Court. See id. at 79. In 2013, the Supreme Court
estimated that there were about 230,000 members of the Supreme Court Bar. The Supreme
Court Bar technically refers to those who have been admitted to practice in the Supreme
Court, but at most, only a handful will ever appear there. The fee is cheap, and lawyers want
a credential that may look good to the public. The requirements for admission are minimal.
See SUP. CT. R. 5. For a detailed account of the Supreme Court bar, both "real" and otherwise,
see MCGUIRE, supra note 10.
33. Lazarus, supra note 14, at 1489.
34.

G. EDWARD WHITE, THE MARSHALL COURT AND CULTURAL CHANGE 1815-1835,

at 208 (1998).
35. Roberts, supra note 28, at 76.
36. Id. at 75.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol72/iss1/9
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"experienced advocates or recidivists." 40 He defined those as lawyers with at
least three previous arguments before the Court. 4 1 In 1980, only 10% were

experienced counsel by his definition.42 In 2002, the number more than tripled
to 33%.43 His criterion of three arguments as denoting experienced counsel

appears quite modest compared to the data in Table 1, with some lawyers
having argued over 100 cases. 44 Chief Justice Roberts also noted that in the
2002 Term, "there were fourteen different non-Solicitor General repeat
performers who argued at least twice-accounting for fully [24%] of the nonSolicitor General argument slots, a tenfold increase." 45
Four years after Chief Justice Roberts's lecture, law professor Richard
Lazarus published a seminal article detailing the rise of the modern Supreme
Court bar.46 Lazarus noted that, "what has gone wholly unrecognized by all,
including legal scholars, is how the re-emergence of a Supreme Court Bar of
elite attorneys similar to the early-nineteenth-century Bar in its domination of
Supreme Court advocacy is quietly transforming the Court and the nation's
laws." 47 Well, not wholly unrecognized-Kevin McGuire and Chief Justice
Roberts wrote and spoke about this, and he gave them due credit-but the
Lazarus article was a thorough documentation and analysis of the
phenomenon in 2008, and he raised many questions about why this must be a
concern.

48

His article became a touchstone for future references to the

phenomenon, reinforcing McGuire's and Chief Justice Roberts's findings that
the trend of repeat players was continuing. 49 As one example, in the 1980
Term, of those private lawyers who argued, only 2% had made ten or more
previous arguments before the Court, and only 3% had more than one
argument that Tenn.

50

In comparison, in the 2007 Term, 28% had ten or more

arguments before the Court, and 24% argued more than one case in that
term. 5' His data show that the trend noted by Chief Justice Roberts not only
continued but also was more significant, in light of the fact that the number of
argued cases per term had decreased.
Table 1 demonstrates that the presence of repeat players observed by
McGuire, Lazarus, and Chief Justice Roberts has increased significantly and
is even more noteworthy in light of the fact that today, there are significantly
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

Id. at 75-76.
Id. at 76.
Id.
Id.
See supra Table 1.
Roberts, supra note 28, at 76.
Lazarus, supra note 14, at 1490.
Id.
See id. at 1521-62.
Lazarus, supra note 14, at 1490; see, e.g., Feldman, supra note 14, at 431.
See Lazarus, supra note 14, at 1520.
See id.
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fewer oral arguments that occur in the Supreme Court. In the 1981 Term, there
were 167 written opinions. 52 In the 2016 Term, there were only sixty-two.53

For many years now, the number of argued cases with signed opinions has
hovered in the sixties.54 With a few repeat players making more of the
arguments in fewer cases, the elite have become, and are becoming, even more
elite.
Today, argument by private lawyers in the Court is dominated not only
by an elite group of lawyers but also by relatively few powerful law firms. For
example, in the 2013 through 2019 Terms, lawyers from Kirkland & Ellis

appeared in thirty-one cases followed closely by Wilmer Cutler Pickering
Hale and Dorr lawyers with thirty appearances and Jones Day lawyers with
twenty-nine.55 These three firms appeared in 25% of all cases argued. 56
Lawyers from only nine law firms appeared a total of 229 times, meaning they
argued in almost 50% of cases across those seven Tenns.

57

The top twenty-

six law firms, plus three law school clinics, argued in almost 83% of all
cases. 58
Table 2. Oral Arguments by Law Firm or Clinic

59

October Terms 2013-2019
Law Firm or Clinic

Oral
Arguments

Running
Total

Percent
Running Total

Kirkland & Ellis LLP

31

31

6.67%

Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale

30

61

13.12%

29

90

19.36%

and Dorr LLP
Jones Day

The Statistics, 96 HARv. L. REv. 304, 304 tbl.1 (1982).
See also Kedar Bhatia, Stat Packfor October Term 2016, SCOTUSBLOG 27 (June
28,
2017),
https://www.scotusblog.com/wpcontent/uploads/2017/06/SB_Stat_Pack_2017.06.28.pdf [https://perma.cc/3LWC-6MWL].
54. Adam Feldman, FinalStat Packfor October Term 2019, SCOTUSBLOG 12 (July 10,
2020)
[hereinafter Feldman,
OT19 Stat Pack], https://www.scotusblog.com/wpcontent/uploads/2020/07/Final-Statpack-7.20.2020.pdf [https://perma.cc/2P9Q-L39A].
55. See infra Table 2.
56. See infra Table 2.
57. See infra Table 2.
58. See infra Table 2. As in Table 1, the Percent Running Total refers to cases not all oral
arguments. Therefore, of all the cases that had oral argument, the first four firms appeared in
25.16% of those cases.
59. Table 2 also contains three law school clinics. They are included to give an overall
picture of all nongovernment repeat players. Clinics might not be thought of as similar to forprofit law firms, and much of their representation involves criminal defendants. However, oral
arguments by the clinics are done by elite repeat player lawyers, such as Jeffrey Fisher, Thomas
Goldstein, and Pamela Karlan.
52.
53.
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October Terms 2013-2019
Law Firm or Clinic

Oral
Arguments

Running
Total

Percent
Running Total

Hogan Lovells US LLP

27

117

25.16%

Mayer Brown LLP

23

140

30.11%

Gibson Dunn & Cntcher LLP

23

163

35.06%

Goldstein & Russell, P.C.

23

186

40.00%

Jenner & Block LLP

22

229

49.25%

Sidley Austin LLP

21

207

44.52%

Kellogg, Huber, Hansen, Todd,
Evans & Figel, P.L.L.C.

18

247

53.12%

Stanford Law School, Supreme

18

265

56.99%

18
12
10

283

60.86%

295

63.44%

305

65.59%

Goodwin Procter LLP

9

314

67.53%

O'Melveny & Myers LLP

9

323

69.47%

Stris & Maher LLP

8

331

71.19%

Latham & Watkins, LLP

8

339

72.91%

GeyserP.C.

7

346

74.41%

Quinn Emanuel Urquhart &

6

352

75.70%

Vinson & Elkins LLP

5

357

76.78%

Court Litigation Clinic
Williams & Connolly LLP
Bancroft PLLC

Orrick, Herrington & Sutcliffe
LLP

Sullivan, LLP
Arnold & Porter LLP

4

361

77.64%

Consovoy McCarthy Park PLLC

4

365

78.50%

Perkins Coie LLP

4

369

79.36%

University of Washington

4

373

80.22%

Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP

3

376

80.86%

McDermott Will & Emery LLP

3

379

80.51%

Ropes & Gray LLP

3

382

82.15%

University of Pennsylvania Law

3

385

82.80%

School of Law

School Supreme Court Clinic
By any measure, these data demonstrate an extraordinary concentration
of access and power in very few firms. While legal scholars are more familiar
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with these firms than they are with many of the individual lawyers, it is
unclear how much is known about these firms as power brokers in society. 60
For example, who are their clients? What are their criteria when deciding
which clients to represent and which not to represent? Do they refuse
representation simply because of a client's inability to afford their
representation, or are there other systematic considerations?61
B.

Certiorari

An equally important and powerful determination related to who argues
before the Court is success at getting to the Court in the first place. Today,
only about 1% of cases seeking review are granted certiorari (or cert). 62 Even
in the 1980s, this percentage was low with the Court granting cert in less than
5% of cases. 63 McGuire found that from 1977 to 1982, 22% of cases granted
review were filed by "experienced" private counsel.64 Lazarus reported that
in the 2006 Term, 44% of cases granted review were filed by lawyers he
labeled "expert Supreme Court advocates." 65 In the 2014 Term, this rate was
57.5% (thirty-eight of fifty-six cases). 66 The importance of these repeat

players, then, is not only their influence through briefs and oral arguments but
also their leverage in the agenda setting process. Oral advocates often oversee
certiorari work, but this effort frequently involves other first-rate appellate
lawyers within large powerful firms. 6 7

60. Of course, most of the lawyers in Table 1 are members of these firms, but in some
instances, lawyers moved around within this group.
61. I collected additional data such as whether the law firm (or specific lawyers) tended
to represent petitioners or respondents more, the win loss records, and the subject matter of the
cases. No remarkable differences appeared in the first two categories, but one would not
necessarily expect meaningful differences. As for the subject matter, the categorizations in the
Spaeth data set were examined, but they are not sufficiently nuanced to draw any conclusions
for the purposes of this Article. Further research should look into the nature of the cases, the
clients, and more broadly, the law firms themselves. See Biskupic et al., supra note 13.
62. See Adam Feldman & Alexander Kappner, Finding Certainty in Cert: An Empirical
Analysis of the FactorsInvolved in Supreme Court CertiorariDecisionsfrom 2001-2015, 61
VILL. L. REv. 795, 798 (2016) (discussing the Court's choices to hear cases regarding issues of
controversial public concern).
63. PERRY, supra note 14, at 22.
64. Lazarus, supra note 14, at 1526.
65. Id. at 1516 tbl.2. He defined expert as an attorney serving as counsel of record with
at least five prior oral arguments or an affiliation with a legal organization with at least ten prior
argued cases before the Court. Id. at 1490 n.17.
66. For an empirical overview of certiorari over a long history that addresses the role of
amici, see Feldman & Kappner, supra note 62, at 806-08. See also Larsen & Devins, supra note
14, at 1902-03.
67. Feldman & Kappner, supra note 62, at 803.
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The business of appellate lawyering is not only about getting cert granted;

it is also about getting cert denied. 68 In my interviews with Justices and clerks
about the certiorari process, they told me that experienced Supreme Court
advocates and lower court judges are good at knowing how to "certproof' a
case. 69 Skillful attorneys do this in their brief in opposition to certiorari, and
judges who do not want to be reviewed do it with their opinions. 70 Given that
so few cases are granted review, 71 one might conclude that engaging highpriced elite lawyers would be irrational when the chances of the Court
granting a petition are so low. Apparently, however, ensuring that a favorable
ruling that is being appealed will not be reviewed in the Court is worth big
money, especially for the wealthy and powerful. 72
C.

Growth of the Elite Supreme CourtBar

How did these powerful repeat players come to be? Lazarus tells the
following story:
The modern transformation of the Bar began when Sidley Austin
hired Rex Lee, following his resignation as President Ronald
Reagan's first Solicitor General in the summer of 1985, to create a
Supreme Court and appellate practice in Sidley's D.C. office. Lee set
out to establish a highly visible Supreme Court and appellate practice
that could provide to private sector clients the kind of outstanding
expert advocacy that the Solicitor General's Office had provided
federal agencies. Lee was enormously successful from the outset ....
Just as significant were the identities of Lee's clients .

. .

. Lee had

been hired by a virtual Who's Who of the nation's major
industries....
In one single Term before the Supreme Court, the former Solicitor
General had accomplished what no one had done for decades and
what the Bar had assumed was no longer economically feasible: he

68. Id. at 807.
69. PERRY, supra note 14, at 139, 286-87.
70. Id.
71. Feldman & Kappner, supra note 62, at 795.
72. People often "irrationally" respond to the possibility of loss, or as Kahneman and
Tversky put it, "the cognitive error of loss aversion." That is, potential losses loom larger than
potential gains. Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis ofDecision
Under Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 263, 279 (1979); see also CASS SUNSTEIN, SIMPLER: THE
FUTURE OF GOVERNMENT 64, 84 (2013); Minette E. Drumwright et al., BehavioralEthics and
Teaching EthicalDecision Making, 13 DECISION SCI. J. INNOVATIVE EDUC. 431, 434 (2015).
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had developed a highly profitable Supreme Court practice on behalf
of private sector corporate business clients. 73

Other law firms responded. One example is Chicago-based law firm
Mayer Brown & Platt, which reacted "with an unprecedented raid of much of
the top talent in the solicitor general's office during the spring of 1986."74 The
rivalry among powerful law finrms to have successful Supreme Court practices
has continued and is fierce, 75 though some lawyers have left big finrms to set
up boutique appellate practices, 76
The contagion of creating Supreme Court practices might seem expected.

But as discussed earlier, recall that the growth of Supreme Court practices was
occurring when the Court was drastically reducing its docket. In the 1981
Term, for example, the Burger Court issued 167 written opinions.77 During

the Rehnquist Court, however, the caseload began a steady decline that has
continued with the Roberts Court.7 8 From the 2013 Term to the 2018 Term,

the number of cases consisting of oral argument and signed opinions per term
were sixty-four, sixty-five, sixty-one, sixty-one, fifty-five, and sixty-one,
respectively.

79

In short, because the opportunities to argue before the Court

are dramatically lower, the economics of expensive Supreme Court practices
is puzzling on its face. The explanation lies in the context changes in law finrms
more generally.
III. THE RISE OF SPECIALIZATION IN PRIVATE APPELLATE PRACTICE

The skills needed for effective appellate advocacy are not always
found indeed, perhaps are rarely found in good trial lawyers. 80
-Judge Laurence Silberman, U£.S Courtof Appeals for the D.C. Circuit

It may come as a surprise to learn that historically those who specialized
in appellate work were few. It was not until 1990 that the "American Academy
of Appellate Lawyers was founded" and not until 2000 that "the American
73. Lazarus, supra note 14, at 1498-99.
74. Id. at 1499.
75. Lazarus, supra note 14, at 1500-01.
76. The most notable of these is Thomas Goldstein. According to his website, he left
Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld and formed a boutique that is now Goldstein & Russell,
P.C. See Firm Overview, GOLDSTEN & RUSSELL, P.C., http://www.goldsteinrussell.com/firmoverview/ [https://perna.cc/VP83-QX5Z].
77.

See The Statistics, supra note 52.

78. Margaret Meriwether Cordray & Richard Cordray, The Solicitor General's Changing
Role in Supreme Court Litigation, 51 B.C. L. REV. 1323, 1339 (2010).
79. See Spaeth et al., supra note 18.
80. Laurence H. Silberman, Plain Talk on Appellate Advocacy, 20 LITIG. 3, 3 (1994).
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Bar Association established its Council of Appellate Lawyers .... "81 Many
state bar associations have only recently created special divisions devoted to
appellate advocacy. 82 In his 2004 speech, Chief Justice Roberts briefly noted
"the rise of Supreme Court and appellate practice departments in major law
firms." 83 Evaluating the reason for this change, he suggested:
If one side hires a Supreme Court specialist to present a case, it may
cause the client on the other side to think that they ought to consider
doing that as well. This is just a variant on the old adage that one
lawyer in town will starve, but two will prosper. 84
Nonetheless, this observation and the Rex Lee story told by Lazarus fail to
explain how Supreme Court practices within law firms can be sustained if
there are increasingly less opportunities to appear before the Court. Something
more must be going on. Actually, during this time period much was going on
(and continues to go on) in the restructuring of the legal profession, especially
with regard to large law firms often referred to as "big law." 8 5
Marc Galanter and Thomas Palay, in their book Tournament of Lawyers,

detailed a "crisis" in the legal profession.86 They described many changes and
were highly critical of some of the results.8 7 Notably, they argued that the
crisis made large law firms abandon professional norms in pursuit of growing
profits.88 Others, however, put a positive spin on the changes. 89 Andrew
Bruck and Andrew Canter argued that "[i]n spite of these developments, and
partly because of them, the legal profession also faces an exciting new
opportunity. The shift towards commercialism has introduced external market
forces to an industry long insulated from them." 90 Whatever the normative
assessment of these changes in the legal profession should be, suffice it to say
that some of the changes have encouraged the rise of appellate specialization,
especially in large firms. Having a Supreme Court practice can help sustain a

robust appellate practice and vice versa. 91 A reputable Supreme Court practice
81.
471, 473
82.
83.
84.

James C. Ho, Defending Texas: The Office of the Solicitor General, 29 REv. LITIG.
(2010).
Cf id. The Texas Bar, for example, did not have an appellate section until 1987. Id.
Roberts, supra note 28, at 77.
Id.

85. MARC GALANTER & THOMAS PALEY,
TRANSFORMATION OF THE BIG LAW FIRM 1-3 (1991).

TOURNAMENT

OF

LAWYERS:

THE

86. Id. at 3.
87. Id. at 136-37.
88. Id. at 137-38.
89. See Andrew Bruck & Andrew Canter, Note, Supply, Demand, and the Changing
Economics ofLarge Law Firms, 60 STAN. L. REv. 2087, 2088 (2008).
90. Id. at 2088.
91. See Lazarus, supra note 14, at 1498-99; Bruck & Canter, supra note 89, at 2089.

Published by Scholar Commons,

15

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 72, Iss. 1 [], Art. 9
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

260

[VOL. 72: 245]

makes a firm a hotspot for other appellate work. 92 This is true both in terms
of attracting wealthy clients and in recruiting top-notch lawyers. 93 In these
times, when partners come and go rather than spend their lives at one firm, a
Supreme Court practice is a market advantage for recruiting top talent. 94
A Supreme Court practice also helps recruit some of the most talented
new young lawyers within the market, many of whom have served as law
clerks to appellate judges. Only the top-tier of students have a shot at these
clerkships, and when obtained, they dramatically heighten the student's elite
status. 95 A few clerks will go on to be Supreme Court clerks, which becomes
an even better ticket to enormous salaries and "big law" prestige. 96 Each year,
there are roughly twenty-five to thirty Supreme Court clerks in the job market
as well as highly talented clerks from the federal courts of appeal. 97 These
young lawyers are prized recruits, and big law firms fight to get them. 98 They
are already an elite group, almost always having gone to elite law schools and
graduating at the top of their class. 99 After clerkships, the work these lawyers
do is generally appellate work.100 Still, at some point, there must be a market
to sustain all of this. Thomas Hungar, one of the elites who frequently argues
before the Court and who co-chairs the appellate practice group at Gibson
Dunn, detects a market-based explanation.101 He and his co-author wrote:
Our contention is that the external factor that drove all of these
pioneers to start private appellate practices at essentially the same

time was the changing economics of large-firm law practice in the

92. See Lazarus, supra note 14, at 1498-99.
93. Id. at 1499.
94. Id.
95. See Catherine Rampell, Judges Compete for Law Clerks on a Lawless Terrain, N.Y.
TIMES (Sept. 23, 2011), https://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/24/business/judges-compete-for-lawclerks-on-a-lawless-terrain.html [https://perna.cc/M7LV-CNXZ]; David Lauter, Clerkships:
Picking the Elite, NAT'L L.J., Feb. 9, 1987, at 1; John Shiffman, Former Clerks: Today's
Prospects,
Tomorrow's
Elite,
REUTERS
(Dec.
8,
2014,
5:52
AM),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-scotus-firms-clerks/former-clerks-todays-prospectstomormws-elite-idUSKBN0JM10Y20141208 [https://penna.cc/K69G-V3UU].
96.

See, e.g., Jones Day Lands a Record 11 Supreme Court Law Clerks as Associates,

NAT'L L.J., Nov. 13, 2018, at 1.
97. Id.
98. The NationalLaw Journal, especially articles by Tony Mauro, frequently reports on
the recruitment efforts by law firms, both with regard to "raids" among the firms for high
powered lawyers to things like which law firm recruited the most Supreme Court law clerks
every year. See, e.g., Tony Mauro, How Jones Day Corneredthe Market on SCOTUS Clerks,
NAT'L L.J., Dec. 12, 2017, at 1, 2.
99. Shiffman, supra note 95.
100. See id.
101. Thomas G. Hungar & Nikesh Jindal, Observations on the Rise of the Appellate
Litigator, 29 REV. LITIG. 511, 521-22. (2009).
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1980s. During that period, with the newly competitive market for

legal services, law firms scrambled to find ways to distinguish
themselves from their peers. One way in which they did this was by
establishing appellate practice groups.10 2

Only recently has information about law firms become easily
attainable.1 03 Citing Galanter and Palay,1 04 Bruck and Canter, 05 and others,
Hungar and Jindal observed:
Corporate counsel began to abandon their long-standing relations
with a single firm and shop for the best value in legal services. This
competitiveness reached new heights after the Supreme Court struck
down the bar on law firm advertising in 1977. Publications like The
American Lawyer and The National Law Journalbegan ranking law
firms. For the first time, law finrs knew what their peer firs
were

charging, who their clients were, what their partners were making,
and how they stood relative to one another....
Starting an appellate practice-particularly one centered on well-

known Supreme Court advocates-was one way firms could
distinguish themselves. . . . Moreover, firms could often bill top
dollar to clients for the high-caliber and big-name legal expertise
required for Supreme Court practice.1 06
Another change in the legal profession that has an interesting effect on
appellate lawyering is the growth of those working as in-house counsel. As
legal fees continued to grow, companies began handling more legal business
in-house.1 07 This encouraged law finrms, particularly large firms, to develop
specialties not suited to in-house counsel. Hungar and Jindal argued, "[a]s
appellate representation has evolved as a specialty practice area, even general

litigators find that it is good practice to enlist experienced appellate
specialists, or at the very least experienced appellate co-counsel, when a case
is appealed (if not before)."1 08
102. Id.
103. Though it is hard to imagine today, when I began my research involving interviews
with former Supreme Court law clerks, it was not easy even to find their names. The Court
would not release the names of former clerks and the only way I could find their names was to
know clerks willing to provide this information. See PERRY, supra note 14, at 10.
104. Hungar & Jindal, supra note 101, at 522 nn.57-58.
105. Bruck & Canter, supra note 89.
106. Hungar & Jindal, supra note 101, at 522-23.
107. Id. at 523.
108. Id. at 524.
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Yet another potential reason for the increased demand of high-priced
appellate lawyers is that the federal judiciary, and the current Court in
particular, has become more receptive to business interests.1 09 Individual
litigants want to win their cases, and quality appellate counsel is often worth
the money." 0 Sometimes, however, it is about more than just winning a
particular case. Sophisticated business players understand the importance of
trying to change the law to make it more business friendly."'l This requires an
appellate strategy beyond any one case.1 1 2
If firms continue to grow their appellate practices, increasing supply will
necessitate stimulating demand." 3 Though examining the consequences of

this is beyond the scope of this Article, it is worth noting that this will result
in more incentives to recruit clients for appellate challenges and not to
dissuade them from choosing to appeal. Additionally, as the amicus market
continues to grow, much of that business is stimulated by big law firms." 4
This ramped up appellate activity will change the volume and lobbying efforts
brought to appellate courts in addition to the Supreme Court. Increased
appellate activity will ultimately effect doctrine. "5 For example, it is not
uncommon to see opinions adopt reasoning that was found in litigant or amici
briefs or at oral argument.i 6 If this is so at the Supreme Court, it seems even
more likely that lawyers have the opportunity to shape doctrine in other courts
with far heavier caseloads and less support-where judges rely on lawyers to
bring them information far more often than the Court does. "1? Paying for more
lawyering, especially from the Am Law 100 firms, will surely draw a
distinctive clientele likely to be disproportionately wealthy and powerful. The
109. Jeffrey Rosen, Supreme Court Inc., N.Y. TIMES (Mar.
16, 2008),
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/16/magazine [https://penna.cc/P23C-HLRG].
110. Hungar & Jindal, supra note 101, at 525.
111. Id.
112. See supra Part III.
113. Id. at 523; see also Lazarus, supra note 14, at 1503 (providing an overview of
appellate practice supply and demand).
114. The literature on the role of amici is extensive in both law and political science. See,
e.g., Larsen & Devins, supra note 14, at 1907. In addition to its own important contributions, it
is a good source for seeing the wide range of research done on amicus curiae.
115. See H.W. Perry Jr. & Patrick Keyzer, Human Rights Issues in ConstitutionalCourts:
Why Amici Curiae are Important in the U.S., and What Australia Can Learn from the U.S.

Experience, 36 LAW IN CONTEXT (forthcoming 2020) (manuscript at 8) (on file with author).
116. See, e.g., James F. Spriggs II & Paul J. Wahlbeck, Amicus Curiae and the Role of
Information at the Supreme Court, 50 POL. RSCH. Q. 365, 376 (1997).
117. Judge Jeffrey S. Sutton, United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, in
comments made at a Mini-Symposium on 51 IMPERFECT SOLUTIONS at the University of Texas
at Austin School of Law (Feb. 4, 2020). See generally Allison Lucas, Friendsof the Court? The
Ethics of Amicus Brief Writing in FirstAmendment Litigation, 26 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1605,
1610 (1999) (providing examples where lower courts "indicated that the views of amici
influenced their opinions").
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logic here seems sound, but questions about the effect that a growth in elite
appellate lawyering undoubtedly will have on law and doctrine needs
systematic empirical investigation beyond the scope of this Article.
Up to this this point, two related but separate trends in appellate advocacy
have been discussed: (1) the nature of the modern Supreme Court Bar being
dominated by a relatively small group of private lawyers and law firms and
(2) the creation and expansion of elite appellate law practices. This Article
now turns to a third trend involving changes in appellate advocacy by the
federal government and state governments.
IV. APPELLATE ADVOCACY BY GOVERNMENTS

The Solicitor General is not a neutral, he is an advocate; but an
advocate for a client whose business is not merely to prevail in the
instant case. My client's chief business is not to achieve victory, but
to establishjustice.

Solicitor GeneralSimon E. Sobeloff""
Significant changes have occurred in the lawyering and the lawyers who
represent the federal and state governments before the Court.119 In some ways,
these changes mirror trends in the private bar,12 0 and the changes in each
sector may be influencing the other.
A.

The Solicitor General of the United States

The Solicitor General of the United States (SG) sits atop the appellate
structure for the entire federal government.121 Effectively, no one gets to the
Court but through the SG.1 22 No government lawyer-whether agency
counsel, U.S. Attorney, or head of a division at the Justice Department-can
appeal a case without the approval of the SG.1 23 The SG's judgment is rarely
overturned by the Attorney General or the President.1 24 Attorneys General and
Presidents came to realize long ago that it is in their long-term interest to defer
118.
Office, 41
119.
120.

Simon E. Sobeloff, Attorneyfor the Government: The Work ofthe Solicitor General's
A.B.A. J. 229, 229 (1955).
See Lazarus, supra note 14, at 1504-05.
Id.
121. REBECCA MAE SALOKAR, THE SOLICITOR GENERAL: THE POLITICS OF LAW 2
(1992).
122. See id. at 4-5.
123. See id. at 108.
124. See generally Drew S. Days III, When the President Says No: A Few Thoughts on
&

Executive Power and the Tradition of Solicitor General Independence, 3 J. APP. PRAC.

PROCESS 509, 509-19 (2001) (providing examples of the President overruling the SG).
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to the SG about litigation strategies.1 25 It is rare for the SG not to decide what

to appeal and how to argue the appeal.1 26
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) is the epitome of elite
lawyering and repeat players. Justice Thurgood Marshall said that being SG
was "the best job I've ever had, bar none!"1 27 Former SG Rex Lee recalled,
"When I heard that I was being considered, I was very much hoping that I
would be picked because that is, very simply . . . one of the creamiest, . . . no,
it is probably the creamiest lawyering job in the country."1 28 The OSG has
always been the workplace of choice for many of the best appellate lawyers
in the nation.1 29 As such, the government has extraordinary lawyers
representing it before the Court. But the importance of the OSG does not stop
there. It is hard to overstate the role that the SG has traditionally played in
setting the Court's agenda. 30 Over the years, the SG's petitions for a writ of
certiorari are granted at vastly higher rates than other parties. There are many
reasons for this difference. One of the Court's primary considerations for
granting cert is the importance of the case.' 3 ' The SG has an advantage in
getting cases before the Court because it represents the United States, whose
interests are important by definition.1 32
Another factor is that for decades, the OSG has been a crucial aid to the
Justices in their burdensome task of screening thousands of cases each
Term.' 33 Justices across the legal and political spectrum have come to rely on
and trust the OSG, especially in the cert process. 3 4 As the quintessential
repeat player, the OSG understands not only how the Justices see their role
but also what the Justices are looking for. 3 5 The OSG assists the Justices in
125. Id. at 509.
126. See id.
127. LINCOLN CAPLAN, THE TENTH JUSTICE: THE SOLICITOR GENERAL AND THE RULE

OF LAW 261 (1987).
128. SALOKAR, supra note 121, at 33.
129. See PERRY, supra note 14, at 132-33.
130. Id. at 132-33; see also SALOKAR, supra note 121, at 8-9; Kevin T. McGuire,
Explaining Executive Success in the US. Supreme Court, 51 POL. RSCH. Q. 505 (1998); and
RICHARD L. PACELLE, BETWEEN LAW & POLITICS: THE SOLICITOR GENERAL AND THE
STRUCTURING OF RACE, GENDER, AND REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS LITIGATION (2003). For an

example of more recent work, see Christine Bird, Blessed and Highly Favored: The Office of
the Solicitor General's Policy Agenda (July 1, 2020) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with
author).
131. PERRY, supra note 14, at 253-54 (discussing categories of important cases).
132. Id. at 254.
133. Throughout this Article, I use the terms "OSG" and "SG" almost interchangeably.
The SG is often represented at the Court by a Deputy SG or an Assistant to the SG. When I
speak of the functions or the reputation of the SG, it includes those in the OSG. Over the years,
many of the lawyers in that office have served different SGs across administrations.
134. PERRY, supra note 14, at 128-29.
135. See id. at 128.
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this function by being highly selective in the cases that it chooses to petition
for review or to enter as amicus curiae. It also writes briefs in opposition to
certiorari as a party or an amicus to the case, identifying problems in support
of a denial.' 3 6 Though an advocate, the OSG understands the needs of the
Court and tries to accommodate those needs even if it frustrates the
government in the short term. The Court so values the OSG in that if the SG
has not weighed in, the Court often "calls for the views of the Solicitor
General" (CVSG) both for its certiorari decision as well as for its decision on
the merits.137

Service to the Court by the SG is not wholly altruistic. As a repeat player,
it is in the OSG's long-term interest to be absolutely candid with the Justices
and helpful to them. Because the Justices trust the OSG to shoot straight with
them and to look out for the Court's interest as well as its own, the OSG's
credibility translates into a success rate for cert grants.' 38 When the OSG says
to the Court, "you ought to take this case," it often does.1 39 That is not to say
that as an advocate, the OSG does not strongly advocate for the government's
position; it should, and it does. But SGs are unique among advocates in
viewing their responsibility as being broader than winning a particular case as
Solicitor General Sobeloff put it in the epigraph above.' 4 0 As yet another
example of this, attorneys in the OSG will confess error.1 4' This would be a
dicey proposition for private counsel.
The OSG's reputation carries over to its role when filing amicus briefs.
Attorneys often try to get the OSG to file an amicus brief on behalf of the
client. Sometimes the OSG will file an amicus brief on its own initiative.1 42
The SG's amicus briefs are always accepted by the Court, and the SG is often
given time at oral argument, whether or not the litigant they are supporting
wants to share time with them.1 43 As noted above, the Court frequently calls
for the views of the SG to serve as an amicus.14

136. Id. at 49-50.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 128.
139. Id. at 130-33. For a possible exception, see CAPLAN, supra note 127, at 260
(suggesting that under the tenure of Charles Fried, this trust was damaged). Grumblings have
started to emerge about President Trump's SG and the Administration's use of the Supreme
Court. See Stephen I. Vladeck, The Solicitor General and the Shadow Docket, 133 HARv. L.
REv. 123, 124 (2019).
140. Simon E. Sobeloff, Attorneyfor the Government: The Work ofthe Solicitor General's
Office, 41 A.B.A. J. 229, 229 (1955).
141. Id. at 230.
142. Cordray & Cordray, supra note 78, at 1331.
143. Id.; SUP. CT. R. 37.4.
144. Cordray & Cordray, supra note 78, at 1331.
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1.

Changes in the Solicitor General's CourtParticipation

A significant change has occurred regarding the OSG's participation in
the Supreme Court that is not often discussed. During roughly the same period
of growth in the elite cadre of private counsel and decline in Court's docket,
petitioning for certiorari by the OSG has declined dramatically, decreasing the
cases in which the United States is a party.1 45 This decline does not mean that
the OSG's grants are rejected more often; rather, it means that the OSG is now
seeking far fewer grants.' 4 6 From the 2008 Term to the 2019 Term, requests
declined precipitously.1 47 For example, in the 1985 and the 1986 Terms, the

OSG filed fifty-seven and fifty-six petitions for certiorari respectively.1 48 For
the Terms covered in this Article, the respective numbers of petitions were
only fourteen, seventeen, fifteen, twenty-five, twenty-two, thirteen, three,
nineteen,

seventeen,

thirteen,

twenty-three,

and

twenty-six.1 49

The

simultaneous changes of the declining docket, decreasing role of the SG as a
litigant, and increasing role of cases argued by the private bar may not be
causal, but the intersection is consequential.
Though the OSG seeks fewer grants and argues in fewer cases, it would
be a mistake to conclude that the government has gone away. Instead, the OSG
has shifted the manner in which it participates in Court. It participates now in
greater numbers as an amicus rather than as a party.1 50 And the role the OSG
plays as amicus has changed as well. In the early 1980s, the OSG participated
in oral argument in approximately 10% of the cases in which it was an
amicus.151 Now, the OSG participates in oral argument for most cases in
which it is an amicus. 5 2

Perhaps what is most interesting for the purposes of this Article is that as
the OSG seeks fewer spots on the docket for its own cases, there are more
slots available for others, notably private parties and state governments.1 53
With the decrease in the OSG's share of the docket as litigant, private interests
145. See id. at 1323 (analyzing the reduction of petitions for certiorari and other changes
in the OSG). See generally Chris Nicholson & Paul M. Collins, The SolicitorGeneral'sAmicus
Curiae Strategiesin the Supreme Court, 36 AM. POL. RSCH. 382, 400-06 (2008) (discussing the
OSG's amicus strategies).
146. Cordray & Cordray, supra note 78, at 1347.
147. Id. at 1342.
148. Id. at 1348.
149. I derived these numbers from the OSG's database collecting the Office's Supreme
Court Briefs, which date back to 1985. Supreme Court Briefs, U.S. DEP'T OF JUST.,
https://www.justice.gov/osg/supreme-court-briefs [https://perna.cc/8VFU-6KBE].
150. Cordray & Cordray, supra note 78, at 1323; Lazarus, supra note 14, at 1493-94.
151. Cordray & Cordray, supra note 78, at 1355.
152. Id. at 1355-56.
153. This is not a zero-sum game: there is not a set number of cases for a Term.
Nevertheless, in a given era, the Court's docket seems to grant about the same number of cases.
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play an increasingly important role as agenda setters who are represented by

elite repeat players. There is some indication that the Court is seeing private
counsel in ways that once were reserved for the OSG."' In referring to the
elite private lawyers, Justice Kennedy said, "'[t]hey are on the front lines and
they apply the same standards' as the justices do."" This type of language
was once reserved only for the lawyers in the OSG.
2.

Change in CareerPatterns

Finally, SGs usually come and go with their President, though Erwin
Griswold served both Johnson and Nixon; but in the past, lawyers in the OSG
often served many years, their tenure spanning several SGs.1 56 A prime

example of this is Deputy Solicitor General Lawrence Wallace who served for
thirty-five years and by most accounts was highly influential as SGs came and
went. Now, many work at the OSG for a few years and then move quickly
into private practice. 5 7 Among the new group of elite private lawyers arguing
before the Court, many formerly worked in the OSG.' 58 In fact, of the top ten
lawyers in the Terms studied in this Article, six had either served as the SG or
worked in the OSG.' 59
B.

Elite Litigatorsfor States: The Rise of State Solicitors General

Appellate litigation is a distinct specialty and the reasonfor that is
clear. Legal disputes are differentfrom factual disputes. They involve

different audiences, tap into different skills, and require different
strategies. And clients are increasingly noticing the difference

including states. 160
-James C. Ho, FormerSolicitor General of Texas

When I interviewed the Justices and clerks years ago for my book on
agenda setting in the U.S. Supreme Court, one complaint I heard frequently
154. See Biskupic et al., supra note 13.
155. Id.
156. See SALOKAR, supra note 128, at 62-63.
157. See Ryan C. Black & Ryan J. Owens, The Success ofFormer Solicitors General in
PrivatePractice: Costly and Unnecessary?,2016 MICH. ST. L. REv. 325, 342.

158. Id. ("[F]ormer OSG attorneys are involved in nearly half the cases on the Court's
docket.").
159. See infra Table 4. The success of these former OSG attorneys, however, is debatable.
Id. at 364 ("Former OSG attorneys are skilled and successful .... But it does not appear that
they are any more likely to win their cases than attorneys with similar experiences and
characteristics who never worked in the OSG.").
160. Ho, supra note 81, at 509.
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from both Justices and clerks was how bad the lawyers were who represented
states in the U.S. Supreme Court.161 I was told that they were generally

"awful" appellate lawyers, with one exception that many mentioned-Slade
Gorton, who had been the attorney general for the state of Washington.1 62 The
low quality seemed to be a particular frustration for the Justices who were
trying to reinvigorate federalism and state power, but the assessment was
widespread among personnel at the Court irrespective of their attitudes toward
federalism.1 63 Many of my informants suggested that state attorneys general
were usually in their positions because they were good politicians, not because
they were great lawyers-certainly not first-rate appellate lawyers-and a
successful political career was usually their goal.1 64 When a case made it to
the Court, the state attorney general often could not resist arguing the case.1 65
It is a rare opportunity and a thrill for any lawyer to argue before the Court.1 66
It is also good politics for a politician. Depending upon the case, the attentive

public may reach beyond his or her state, which can help a politician aspiring
to higher office. From the Justices' perspective, however, the thirty minutes
of fame for the state attorney general was frustrating.167 The problem was not
always attorneys general. Some states allowed (and still do) the person who
started the case to carry through until the end.1 68 These attorney generals
(AGs) and trial attorneys were generally not practiced in the role of appellate
argument.1 69 The lack of good appellate lawyering not only hampered oral
argument, but it also often meant the briefs were often poor quality.17 0
As the Ho quotation above suggests, in the last several years, things began
to change and continue to do so. Many states have come to understand that in
161. PERRY, supra note 14, at 127.
162. Id.
163. See also Ryan J. Owens & Patrick C. Wohlfarth, State Solicitors General, Appellate
Expertise, and State Success Before the U.S. Supreme Court, 48 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 657, 667
(2014).
164. PERRY, supra note 14, at 127.
165. See also Owens & Wohlfarth, supra note 163, at 667.
166. Justice Sotomayor lamented about the lure as well, although her complaint was not
limited to state attorneys general. She explained: "I think it's malpractice for any lawyer who
thinks this is my one shot before the Supreme Court and I have to take it." Janet Roberts et al.,
In Ever-Clubbier Bar, Eight Men Emerge as Supreme Court Confidants, REUTERS (Dec. 8,
2014, 5:57 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-scotus-advocates-specialreport/specialreport-in-ever-clubbier-bar-eight-men-emerge-as-supreme-court-confidantsidUSKBNOJM11E20141208.
167. See also Thomas R. Morris, States Before the U.S. Supreme Court: State Attorneys
General as Amicus Curiae, 70 JUDICATURE 298, 300 (1987).
168. See, e.g., Symposium Transcript, The Rise ofAppellate Litigatorsand State Solicitors
General, 29 REV. LITIG. 545, 650 (2010) [hereinafter Symposium].
169. See Hungar & Jindal, supra note 101, at 529-36, for a discussion of the different skill
sets needed for trial lawyers and appellate litigators.
170. See Morris, supra note 167, at 300.
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order to be more effective, they need better appellate lawyering, certainly in
the U.S. Supreme Court but also in federal courts of appeal as well as within
their own supreme and appellate courts.' 7 1 Many states have responded by
creating the role of state solicitor general (SSG) or an analogous position.17 2

Sometimes the role involves only one person, but other times the state's goal
is to become more like the U.S. Solicitor General and develop a corresponding
office of the state solicitor general (OSSG). 73 The trend in states is obvious.
Beginning in the 1980s and 1990s, there was dramatic growth in the creation
of SSGs.' 74 Before 1980, only seven states had a position similar to an SSG.'1 5

Starting in the 1980s, however, states started moving to some form of an
appellate specialist.' 7 6 By 1988, there were eleven states and by 2001, twentyfour. '7 In 2014, there were approximately forty-three including the District

of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands. 78
Lately, scholars have begun to write more about states' evolving roles in
litigation. The focus is often on the state attorney general (AG) or the states
as legal entities.1'9 But little scholarly attention has been paid to SSGs.' 80
171. Layton, supra note 121, at 542.
172. The name may be something different. Some, for example, are called "Appellate
Chief." Now, most are called "Solicitor General." In a few states, the SSG is a statutorily created
position, but in most states, it is a creation of the AG. The SSG serves at the AG's pleasure (not
that of the governor or legislature). Banks Miller, Describing the State Solicitors General, 93
JUDICATURE 238 (2010).

173. Unlike at the federal level, in most states, there is usually a distinction between civil
and criminal jurisdiction. At the state level, criminal prosecution usually resides with elected
district attorneys (DAs) who are not under the AG, and many SSGs have limited authority in the
criminal realm. Layton, supra note 121, 538-41.
174. Banks Miller suggests there may be various explanations for the growth.
Acknowledging that some attorneys general felt the need for better state level advocacy, he
nonetheless tries to develop a more systematic explanation. He suggests that adoption came in
three waves, and he looks at state and case statistics to try to predict early adopters. He also
suggests that there could be a diffusion of innovation model at work. Miller, supra note 172.
175. See Layton, supra note 121, at 536. New York was probably the first to create such a
position.
176. See Ho, supra note 81, at 471-72.
177. Layton, supra note 121, at 534.
178. Told to the author by Dan Schweitzer, head of the Supreme Court Project at the
National Association of Attorneys General (NAAG).
179. See, e.g., PAUL NOLETTE, FEDERALISM ON TRIAL: STATE ATTORNEYS GENERAL
AND NATIONAL POLICYMAKING IN CONTEMPORARY AMERICA 3 (2015); Cornell W. Clayton,

Law, Politics and the New Federalism: State Attorneys General as Nation Policymakers, 56
REV. POL. 525, 525 (1994); Cornell W. Clayton & Jack McGuire, State Litigation Strategies
and Policymaking in the U.S. Supreme Court, 11 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 17 (2001). Numerous
law professors have written on this as well. See, e.g., Margaret H. Lemos & Ernest A. Young,
State Public-Law Litigation in an Age ofPolarization,97 TEX. L. REV. 43, 43 (2018).
180. One of the first scholars to focus on the rise of SSGs in detail was Banks Miller, supra
note 174, at 238. Some legal journalists have written about SSGs as well. See, e.g., Marcia Coyle,
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When trying to understand the evolution to SSGs for appellate work, many
point to the role played by the National Association of Attorneys General
(NAAG) and its "Center for Supreme Court Advocacy" headed by Dan
Schweitzer, the Supreme Court counsel for that organization.181 Today,
NAAG plays a critical support role for both AGs and SSGs.' 8 2 It helps
facilitate joint efforts among states, often arranging high-level moots for state
counsel who are going to argue in the Supreme Court. 83 Schweitzer has been
and continues

to be an important figure,

certainly

encouraging

the

development of SSGs.' 84 Missouri Solicitor General Layton explained
NAAG's importance as follows:
I don't want to say that it was NAAG itself that... gets the credit for
it [the growth of SSGs], but it is instrumental in it happening...

[With the creation of the Supreme Court Project] NAAG created an
entity within the organization that was dedicated to improving the
quality of advocacy by the states in the United States Supreme Court.
So for the first time, NAAG had some place within its organization
that was worried about appellate practice.

. . .

Also, in the 1980s the

conferences of the chief deputies were developed. 185
Layton then went on to recount several meetings involving SSGs, and policy
entrepreneurs who pushed for the idea of states adopting the SSG model.18 6

JusticesListen to a Key Voice; State Solicitors General Get More Time in High Court, NAT'L

&

L.J.
(Apr.
7,
2008),
https://www.law.com/nationallawjoumal/almID/900005507976/
[https://perma.cc/Y9R8-4YF9]; Tony Mauro, Stating Their Case, LEGAL TIMES (Aug. 11, 2003,
12:00 AM), https://www.law.com/almID/900005392144/ [https://perma.cc/BZ82-59ZP]. A
symposium at the University of Texas Law School that involved SSGs, state and federal judges,
appellate specialists, and others has been a "go to" cite for many subsequent articles and
knowledge about SSGs. Symposium, supra note 168. Other scholars, such as Owens
Wohlfarth, supra note 163, have brought quantitative rigor to examine the effectiveness of
SSGs. Their methodology and findings are complex, and they conclude that having SSGs
improves the effectiveness of states in court. Little, however, has been written about the internal
workings of SSGs and their offices. Articles dealing with state litigation usually refer to the AGs
because much of the discussion does not involve appellate litigation, and it understates the
involvement of SGs in state litigation strategy. More direct examination of SGs and their offices
is needed. To that end, I have been interviewing current and former SSGs and lawyers in their
offices (OSSGs) to learn more about them and their efforts.
181. NAAG Center for Supreme Court Advocacy, NAT'L ASS'N ATT'YS GEN.,
https://www.naag.org/naag/aboutnaag/center-supreme-court.php
[https://perma.cc/8WJKDXYB].
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. See Symposium, supra note 168, at 710.
185. Id. at 638.
186. Id.
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Though there has been dramatic growth and movement toward SSGs,
most are relatively new and many different models have developed among
states.' 7 First is the difference in size, funding, and staffing.1 88 One state SG
told me "I have basically a desk in an office and most of what I do is try to
help other state lawyers by reviewing their appellate briefs and making
suggestions."1 89 At the other end of the spectrum is a relatively large office
with high-powered appellate lawyers resembling the OSG in many ways.1 90
New York and Texas fit this model.191 The New York office is one of the
oldest and most prestigious, but the Texas position was not created until
1999.192 Ohio also played an important role by example through the leadership
of Richard Cordray and Jeffrey Sutton (now a federal judge). 19 Though not
known for big government or well-paid government employees, the relatively
young Texas office quickly came to be one of the largest and among the
best.1 94 Several of its SGs have served as law clerks at the appellate level,
including for the U.S. Supreme Court and U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit, while others have served in high positions throughout the state and
federal governments.1 95 The Texas OSSG has a large budget and many
lawyers, many of whom either came from, or went to, elite law firms with
specialized appellate practices.1 96

The size, importance, wealth, or complexity of legal issues of a state are
not necessarily correlated with having an SSG or the size of the OSSG. For
example, two rich, important, large states with complex legal issues are
newcomers. In 2013, Massachusetts created the position under AG Martha

187. Interestingly, details of the organization of state legal offices are not easy to find. In
many of their publications and websites, the descriptions are minimal. In fact, it is not easy to
find out in many states if they even have an SSG or an OSSG.
188. See Kevin C. Newsom, The State SolicitorGeneralBoom, 32 APP. PRAC. 6, 7 (2013).
189. Interview with Anonymous (confidential transcript on file with author).
190. Miller, supra note 174, at 240.
191. Ho, supra note 81, at 473; Miller, supra note 174, at 240.
192. Layton, supra note 121, at 536; see also Newsom, supra note 188, at 7.
193. See Symposium, supra note 168, at 639, 703; Newsom, supra note 188, at 6.
194. The Texas SG often coordinates efforts among red states when filing an amicus brief
in the U.S. Supreme Court and has won several "Best Brief Awards" from the NAAG. Ho, supra
note 81, at 480, 482. Texas was the first state office where the U.S. Supreme Court "CVSG'd"
an SSG comparable to what it does with the SG. The case was Rhine v. Deaton, 558 U.S. 811
(2009). Id. at 478 n.24. See also Emma Platoff, As Solicitor General, Kyle Hawkins Will Lead
Texas Fights Against the Federal Government, TEX. TRIB. (Sept.
19, 2018),
https://www.texastribune.org/2018/09/19/Texas-solicitor-general-kyle-hawkins-scott-kellerken-paxton/ [https://perma.cc/2LVX-4PJB].
195. Ho, supra note 81, at 476.
196. See id. at 475-76;
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Coakley1 97 and California first did so under AG Kamala Harris.1 98
California's first SG has just recently stepped down, and its second SG was
appointed in 2019.199 Massachusetts and California, similar in many respects,

have differing structures. In Massachusetts, the first SSG was Peter Sacks, a
long-time, well-respected member of the Massachusetts AG's office who had
overseen appeals in Massachusetts for years. 200 The original SSG structure
consisted of only Sacks and one other person. 20' Unlike Massachusetts,
California anticipated a growing operation and selected an outsider.202 Its first
SSG, Edward DuMont, was a Californian who built his legal career on the
East Coast.203 He served under Seth Waxman in the OSG and as U.S. Deputy
Attorney General.204 He was also nominated by President Obama to the U.S.

Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, but the nomination stalled in
Congress. 205 Some smaller states recruit from within their state AG's office
or bring in an appellate lawyer from a local law firm who is expected to have
a short stint. 206 Sometimes, it is even a law professor on leave. 207

What is striking for the purposes of this Article is how many states, even
some smaller states, are seeking to recruit SSGs of the same caliber as those
who practice in the federal OSG. For example, West Virginia hired Elbert Lin
as its first SG; Lin was a Yale law graduate and U.S. Supreme Court law clerk
practicing law in D.C. with no ties to West Virginia at the time.

20

In 2017,

197. Brandon Gee, Coakley's Creation of State Solicitor' Part of Nationwide Trend,

MASS. L. WKLY. (Aug. 15, 2013), https://masslawyersweekly.com/2013/08/15/coakleys-

creation-of-state-solicitor-part-of-nationwide-trend/ [https://perna.cc/UNB3-LBTW].
198. Press Release, Office of the Attorney General of California, Attorney General Kamala
D. Harris Announces Appointment of California Solicitor General (Oct. 28, 2013) [hereinafter
DuMont Press Release], https://oag.ca.gov/news/press-releases/attomey-general-kamala-d-harrisannounces-appointment-california-solicitor [https://perma.cc/2UNS-ZUG5].
199. Press Release, Office of the Attorney General of California, Attorney General Becerra
Announces Appointment of Michael Mongan as California Solicitor General (July 19, 2019),
https://oag.ca.gov/news/press-releases/attomey-general-becerra-announces-appointment-michaelmongan-california [https://perma.cc/YA4P-VFPN]. Technically California had a position of an
"SG" prior to this one, but the role was not one in the way we think of SGs.
200. See Gee, supra note 197.
201. Id.
202. See DuMont Press Release, supra note 198.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Sheri Qualters,EdwardDuMontAsks Obama to Withdraw HisNomination to Federal
Circuit, NAT'L L.J. (Nov. 9, 2011), https://www.law.com/nationallawjournal/almID/120253104
1506/ [https://perma.cc/KS67-WJSE].
206. See Platoff, supra note 194.
207. See Mary Wood, Professor Toby Heytens Named Virginia Solicitor General, UNIV.

VA. (Jan. 9, 2018), https://www.law.virginia.edu/news/201801/professor-toby-heytens-namedvirginia-solicitor-general [https://perma.cc/84BC-7ZAJ].
208. Eric Eyre, WV AG Morrisey's Solicitor General Lin to Resign, CHARLESTON
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Lin resigned and has been rumored to be a possible appointee to a federal
judgeship. A closer examination of the credentials of SSGs appears in Part
V.C below.
As I interviewed SSGs, many of these high-powered types talked about
how they saw states as now a satisfying place for them to work. Only so many
can go to the U.S. OSG, and some of them are not interested in being in the
big law world, at least while they are wanting to start families. They may well
end up there, but they said that state appellate work no longer seemed like a
backwater. Part of the reasoning for that follows.
The nature of state legal appellate structures is not only changing in terms
of the creation of more professionalized appellate lawyers such as SSGs but
also is changing in some of its emphases, particularly in the U.S. Supreme
Court. State legal entities have often bonded across state lines to resist federal
encroachment on state power. 209 Much of the newfound interest in legal
federalism suggests that states can and do profitably cross party and
ideological lines. 210 However, in these hyper-partisan times, a new sort of
cooperation has emerged or, more precisely, has grown exponentially. As
states have become more red or blue, they also have become more partisan in
their legal presence as litigants but particularly as amici. 211 In 1999, five
Republican AGs formed The Republican Attorneys General Association
(RAGA). 212 According to their website, RAGA's mission was not only to
elect Republican AGs but also "to address the lack of commitment by their
Democrat counterparts to defend federalism, adhere to the law, and apply a
commonsense, free market approach to governing."

2 13

Their website proceeds

to highlight their national partisanship:
"

Republican AGs have been instrumental in unraveling policies
enacted by the Obama Administration, including the EPA's Clean
Power Plan and various rules including Waters of the U.S., the
Department of Labor's overtime rule, the Consumer Financial
Protection Bureau's Arbitration Rule, and many others. 214

GAZETTE-MAIL (Aug. 17, 2017, 12:00 AM), https://www.wvgazettemail.com/news/politics/
wv-ag-morrisey-s-solicitor-general-lin-to-resign/articlef4cd7af8-be56-516e-9d3c-lbf6107f58
8f.html [https://penna.cc/DX3A-VDVC].
209. See NOLETTE, supra note 179, at 41-42.
210. See id. at 28; Lemos and Young, supra note 179, at 91.
211. See NOLETTE, supra note 179, at 188-89.
212. About RAGA, REPUBLICAN ATT'YS GEN. ASS'N, https://republicanags.com/about/
[https://perma.cc/5APM-BA2H].
213. Id.
214. See Rutledge Applauds the EPA's Commitment to

the American

Worker,

REPUBLICAN ATT'YS GEN. ASS'N (Oct. 10, 2017), https://republicanags.com/2017/10/
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"Republican

AGs

are

actively

working

with

the

Trump

Administration to restore the rule of law and correct previous
unconstitutional overreaches ."215

*

Since President Trump was sworn into office, Republican AGs and
RAGA have been interfacing directly with the Trump Administration

and spearheading efforts to preserve, promote, and protect
fundamental beliefs in limited government and the rule of law. 2 16
Democratic AGs got off to a much slower start, which frustrated some
because there was a lot to do in order for them to catch up with RAGA. 217 On
the Democratic Attorneys General Association (DAGA) website, the
association describes its founding and then proceeds to show its identification
with national partisan struggles. 2 18 DAGA also touts journalists' depictions of
its organization:

Founded in 2002 by California AG Bill Lockyer, Iowa AG Tom
Miller, and New Mexico AG Patsy Madrid, DAGA began as a part-

time political committee based in Denver, Colorado. To better
support our Democratic AGs and candidates in executing our
10/rutledge-applauds-epas-commitment-american-worker/
[https://penna.cc/ZX5F-E7VT];
ICYMI: Republican AGs Score Victory Against Costly Obama Overtime Rule, REPUBLICAN
ATT'YS GEN. ASS'N (Sept. 1, 2017), https://republicanags.com/2017/09/01/icymi-republicanags-score -victory-costly-obama-overtime-rule/ [https://perma.cc/2747-UU7Z]; MostAmericans
Support Trump Rewriting Obama's 'Waters of the US'Rule, REPUBLICAN ATT'YS GEN. ASS'N
(Dec. 7, 2017), https://republicanags.com/2017/12/07/poll-americans-support-trump-rewritingobamas-waters-us-rule/ [https://perma.cc/4L5C-WSSU]; Ann Maher, Republican AGs Who
RailedAgainst CFPBAnti-Arbitration Rule, Now on Boardwith BanningArbitration #MeToo,
LEGAL NEWSLINE (Feb. 24, 2018), https://legalnewsline.com/stories/511350518-republicanags-who-railed-against-cfpb-anti-arbitration-rule-now-on-board-with-banning-arbitrationmetoo [https://perma.cc/Q7VX-RJJ8].
215. 2019, A Historic YearforRAGA, REPUBLICAN ATT'YS GEN. ASS'N (Dec. 31, 2019),
https://republicanags.com/2019/12/31/2019-a-historic-year-for-raga/
[https://perma.cc/CN7Y2CDD].
216. Id.
217. Interview with Anonymous (confidential transcript on file with author); see also
Harry Jaffe, Meet the Man Curbing Trump's Power Without Anyone Noticing, POLITICO MAG.
(Feb. 23, 2019), https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2019/02/23/karl-racine-profileattorney-general-emoluments-lawsuit-trump-2020-225200
[https://perma.cc/BJ5X-9RZU]
(asserting that Democratic AGs have formed "a judicial wall against the Trump
[A]dministration"); Stef W. Kight & Sara Fischer, Democratic State AGs Are Leading the
Resistance, AxIOS (July 31, 2019), https://www.axios.com/democrat-state-attomey-generalfighting-trump-6d6d145b-2ff6-420e-a84a-3fe42ec727d1.html
[https://perma.cc/ZCC9-6BS7]
(arguing that Democratic AGs are "some of the most powerful forces fighting [against] the
Trump White House").
218. About DAGA, DEMOCRATIC ATT'YS GEN. ASS'N, http://dems.ag/about/
[https://perma.cc/5MN8-JXFJ].
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mission, the committee moved its operations from Denver, CO to
Washington, DC in 2016 and expanded to a full-time professional
staff that covers campaigns,
recruiting, data analysis,
communications, policy, politics, and fundraising. 2 19
Since 2016, Democratic AGs have seen major successes in taking on the

Trump Administration's repeated attempts to undermine the rule of law
and rollback key protections....
POLITICOMagazine: DemocraticAGs haveformed "ajudicial wall
against the Trump administration"
Axios: DemocraticAGs are "some of the most powerful forcesfighting
the Trump White House"

It is, of course, the SSGs who effect the dreams of the Republican and
Democratic AGs through appellate litigation.220 As a result, the rise of SSGs
has brought about significant changes to appellate litigation, while also
increasing its elitification.
V.

ELITIFICATION: MORE EVIDENCE, MORE QUESTIONS

On the one hand, on the other hand.
Tevye (Fiddleron the RooJ) 22 1

Terms such as "elite" and "elites" often denote a negative connotation and
convey a problematic sense that something either is wrong or justifies
concern. One need only listen to the rhetoric of political candidates or the
public generally to realize that the power of elites or insiders is not something
that is normally lauded. It comes from both sides of the ideological divide. On
the other hand, one's response to the elitification of appellate law might be
"bravo" or "elitism in this context is different." Elitism can connote
meritocracy and high quality.222 Americans often value elitism though they
resist the term. One rarely hears complaints about the fact that one's doctor
went to the best medical school and is the "go to" person for the rich and
powerful. Nor do Americans protest if their child is admitted to one of those
"elite" colleges or universities, or if they become faculty at such places. On
219. Id.
220. See generally Dan Schweitzer, Who Arguesfor the States in the U.S. Supreme Court?,

2 NAGTRI J., Nov. 2017, at 7, 7.
221. FIDDLER ON THE ROOF (United Artists 1971).
222. See WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 736 (1961).
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the other hand, modern society generally begins to express concern when
institutions become dominated by elites. This concern may be especially true
now that the American educational system-traditionally the engine of social
mobility-is becoming increasingly bifurcated at both the secondary and
college levels. 223 American incomes, health, neighborhoods, houses of
worship, sources of news and information, and many other things are
becoming increasingly segregated and bimodal. 224 When this occurs, it is
usually not a good thing and it becomes increasingly difficult to reverse. On
the other hand, elitism can be beneficial in certain contexts, especially in
situations where expertise is valued, and the benefits of expertise are not
limited to fellow elites. Obviously "elite" can have both positive and negative
connotations and consequences. Nonetheless, the dramatic increasingly elite
nature of the Supreme Court should give some pause and cause reflection.
When elitism occurs, it deserves scrutiny even if it is ultimately seen as a
desirable and positive trend.
Parts I and II of this Article described the private lawyers who argue
before the Supreme Court as "elite" because these lawyers comprise such a
small group-by definition elite. 225 However, these lawyers are also elites in

a different sense because of their pedigrees, their wealth, and their workplaces.
Most lawyers who make it to the elite status of frequent oralist in the
Supreme Court start with impressive pedigrees-their law schools and class
rank. Table 3 reports which law schools are represented most by those who
argue before the Supreme Court. 226 This table includes private and
government lawyers. Again, the percentages are based on cases, not total
arguments. 227
Table 3. Arguments by Law School Alumni
October Terms 2013-2019

Law School

Total Oral Arguments

Percent of Cases

Harvard

242

52.04%

Yale

175

37.63%

223.

See

ROBERT D. PUTNAM, OUR KIDS: THE AMERICAN DREAM IN CRISIS 188 (2015).

224. Many have written on this. For a particularly insightful examination, see ROBERT D.
PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE: THE COLLAPSE AND REVIVAL OF AMERICAN COMMUNITY (2000).
See also PUTNAM, supra note 223, at 44.

225. See discussion supra Parts I-II.
226. I tried to obtain information about every lawyer who argued in the Supreme Court for
the seven Terms, the 2013 Tenn through the 2019 Tenn. In a few instances, I was unable to find
relevant information about where the lawyer attended law school or clerkships. As such, the
numbers here and in Table 3 may not be exact, but they are close and the story of
the eliteness would be the same.
227. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
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Table 3. Arguments by Law School Alumni

October Terms 2013-2019
Law School

Total Oral Arguments

Percent of Cases

Chicago

83

17.85%

Columbia

52

11.18%

Stanford

49

10.54%

Virginia

43

9.25%

Texas

42

9.03%

Michigan

36

7.74%

George Washington

35

7.53%

Georgetown

28

6.02%

Pennsylvania

27

5.81%

Duke

23

4.95%

NYU

23

4.95%

Minnesota

21

4.52%

Northwestern

17

3.66%

American

15

3.23%

In the 465 cases that had oral argument, approximately 52% of those cases
had a lawyer who attended Harvard Law School, and 38% of the cases had a
lawyer who attended Yale Law School. Table 3 only reports the top eighteen
law schools who were in double digits or more. 228 Of course, this table only
reflects seven Terms. One might think these data are specific to the terms
studied, but Table 4 suggests the predominance of a few elite law schools will

continue when considering where repeat players went to school. 229
A.

The Private Bar

Becoming an elite lawyer usually starts with a law school pedigree, but it
does not stop there. That pedigree is closely related to the next step up the
eliteness ladder: clerkships in the federal courts of appeal and especially in
the Supreme Court. Table 4 reports these data for private counsel. It also

228. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
229. See also Tony Mauro, SCOTUS Clerks: The Law School Pipeline,NAT'L L.J. (Dec.
11, 2017), https://www.law.com/nationallawjournal/sites/nationallawjournal/2017/12/11/scotusclerks-the-law-school-pipeline/ [https://perma.cc/RGA8-HBDB] (noting that an increasing
percentage of Supreme Court law clerks went to Harvard or Yale).
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indicates which lawyers spent time in the OSG-another leg up when being
recruited into a law firm with a powerful Supreme Court practice. 230
Table 4. Private Counsel Law School, Clerkship, and SG Experience
October Terms 2013-2019
Attorney

Arguments

Law School

Paul D. Clement

32

Neal K. Katyal

24

Jeffrey L. Fisher

Clerkship

Experience

Harvard

Scalia

Yes

Yale

Breyer

Yes

18

Michigan

Stevens

No

Seth P. Waxman

16

Yale

Brennan

Yes

Thomas C. Goldstein

15

American

Wald
(D.C. Cir.)

No

Kannon K. Shanmugam
David C. Frederick

15
14

Harvard
Texas

Carter G. Phillips
Shay Dvoretzky

12
11

Northwestern
Yale

Scalia
White
Burger
Scalia

Yes
Yes
Yes
No

E. Joshua Rosenkranz

9

Georgetown

Brennan

No

Kozinski

Daniel L. Geyser

9

Harvard

(9th Cir.)

No

Adam G. Unikowsky

9

Harvard

No

Paul W. Hughes

8

Yale

Scalia
Motz
(4th Cir.)

Lisa S. Blatt

7

Texas

Ginsburg
(D.C. Cir)

Paul M. Smith

7

Yale

Powell

Yes
No

Gregory G. Garre

6

Rehnquist

Yes

Michael B. Kimberly

6

Yale

Hawkins
(9th Cir.)

No

Christopher Landau

6

Harvard

No

Christopher G. Michel

6

Yale

Scalia and
Thomas
Roberts

Andrew J. Pincus

5

Columbia

Danielle Spinelli

5

Peter K. Stris

5

WaGeon

No

Yes

Greene
(D.D.C.)

No

Harvard

Breyer

No

Harvard

Unknown

No

230. See discussion infra Section V.B.
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Table 4. Private Counsel Law School, Clerkship, and SG Experience
October Terms 2013-2019
Attorney

Arguments

Law School

Clerkship

Experience

Michael A. Carvin

4

Weo
Washington

Unknown
Ukon

No
N

Marc E. Elias

4

Duke

Unknown

No

James A. Feldman

4

Harvard

Brennan

Yes

Mark C. Fleming

4

Harvard

Souter

No

Douglas Hallward-

4

Harvard

Kearse

Yes

O'Connor
Scalia

No
Yes

Driemeier

(2d Cir.)

Allyson N. Ho
William M. Jay

4
4

Erin E. Murphy

4

Georgetown

Roberts

No

Theodor B. Olson

4

U.C. Berkeley

Unknown

Yes

Mark A. Perry

4

Chicago

O'Connor

No

Kevin K. Russell

4

Yale

Breyer

No

Eric Schnapper

4

Yale

Stephanos Bibas

3

Yale

Unknown
Kennedy

No
No

John J. Bursch

3

Minnesota

Loken

No

Catherine M.A. Carroll

3

Michigan

(8th Cir.)
Souter

Erwin Chemerinsky

3

Harvard

Unknown

No

Thomas H. Dupree Jr.

3

Chicago

Smith
(5th Cir.)

No

John P. Elwood

3

Yale

Kennedy

Yes

Miguel Estrada

3

Harvard

Kennedy

No

Noel J. Francisco
Jonathan D. Hacker
Donald B. Verrilli Jr.

3
3
3

Chicago
Michigan
Columbia

Scalia
Unknown
Brennan

Yes
No
Yes

Chicago
Harvard

No

As discussed in Part II, having served as a Supreme Court clerk makes
these lawyers highly sought-after by the big, powerful, influential, elite law
firms. 23 1 Of the forty-four top private advocates for the seven Terms, twenty-

eight (63.6%) clerked for a Supreme Court Justice and usually a Circuit Court
of Appeals judge as well, and eight (18.2%) who did not clerk in the Supreme
Court clerked for a federal judge on the Court of Appeals. Only eight either
231. See Shiffman, supra note 95.
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did not clerk for an appeals court judge or there was no evidence of having
done so.
Recently, it was reported by various sources that the signing bonus for
Supreme Court law clerks offered by several large law firms was $400,000.232
As these young lawyers rise to stardom, they are also able to command very
high fees from clients. 233 Though lawyers' fees are often negotiated with
clients, most of the attorneys listed in Table 1 can afford to say no. One way
to learn about their fees is through publicly filed documents. 234 Former Obama
Administration SG Donald Verrilli (Munger Tolles) reported billing at an
hourly rate of $1,300. Thomas Goldstein, founder of an appellate boutique,
charged $1,350 per hour. Paul Clement (#1 on Table 4) charged a whopping
$1,745 per hour. Christopher Landau (Kirkland & Ellis at the time and now
President Trump's Ambassador to Mexico) charged a mere $1,075 per hour

while working with his partner Paul Clement and representing an offshore
drilling company. 235

To be sure, sometimes famous lawyers and large law firms represent
clients for slightly reduced charges or for free, but typically, star attorneys
serving as repeat players in the Supreme Court are affordable by only certain
types of clients. 236 And the salaries of such lawyers continue to rise. 237 In the
current climate, lawyers are willing to move to a rival firm, and bidding wars
to "steal" talent are common.238 The National Law Journal often reports on
such movement. 239 Reading these reports is almost like reading the sports
pages about star players being recruited once their contracts expire. Even

232. See, e.g., Adam Liptak, Law Firms Pay Supreme Court Clerks $400, 000 Bonuses.
What Are They Buying?, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 21, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/09/
21/us/politics/supreme-court-clerk-bonuses.html [https://penna.cc/9T56-WUAH].
233. See Biskupic et al., supra note 13 (noting the profitability stemming from Supreme
Court litigation).
234. See, e.g., Declaration of Thomas C. Goldstein in Support of Appellant's Motion for
Attorney's Fees at 31, Patel v. City of Los Angeles, 738 F.3d 1058 (9th Cir. 2013) (No. 0856567).
235. Mike Scarcella & Marcia Coyle, What New Supreme Court Cases Reveal About Big
Law Billing Rates, NAT'L L.J. (Aug. 27, 2019), https://www.law.com/nationallawjournal/2019/
08/27/what-new-supreme-court-cases-reveal-about-big-law-billing-rates/

[https://penna.cc/MN7Q-G4KC].
236. See Biskupic et al., supra note 13.
237. See Scarcella & Coyle, supra note 235.
238. Meghan Tribe & Kimberly Strawbridge Robinson, Big Law's Supreme Court Star
Power Competes for Smaller Pie, BLOOMBERG L. (Aug. 13, 2019, 4:56 AM),
https://news.bloomberglaw.com/us-law-week/supreme-court-practices-are-fools-gold-withoutappellate-focus [https://penna.cc/TA93-RH2K].
239. See, e.g., Dan Packel, Mueller, Trump andAppellate Musical Chairs:Key D.C. Firm
Moves in 2019, NAT'L L.J. (Dec. 27, 2019), https://www.law.com/nationallawjournal/2019/
12/27/mueller-trump-and-appellate-musical-chairs-key-d-c-firm-moves-in-2019/

[https://perma.cc/7H3N-MR6T].
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better, these lawyer stories get to report surprise moves that appear to be
unexpected.
B.

United States Office of the Solicitor General

Part IV focused on government attorneys who are elites in a different way
from their sisters and brothers (mostly brothers) in the private bar; they are
not making huge salaries compared to the private law world, and they are often
not representing the rich and powerful. But in other ways, they are very similar
to those in the private bar. They are drawn from the same elite pool of law
schools and federal clerkships as is reflected in Table 5.
Table 5. U.S. OSG Law School and Clerkship Experience Among
Those Who Argued a Minimum of Two Times
October Terms 2013-2019
Attorney

Position

Argments

Law School

Clerkship

SG Deputy

SG

27

Yale

Brennan

20

Columbia

Brennan

Edwin S. Kneedler

SG Deputy

19

Virginia

on

Michael R. Dreeben

SG Deputy;

17

Duke

ir.)

SG Asst.

17

Yale

(4thCi.

SG Deputy;
Acting
SG
SG Asst.

16

Chicago

Thomas

16
15

Chicago
Stanford

Scalia
Breyer

SG Asst.

14

George
Washington

Roberts and
Rehnquist

Ian H. Gershengorn

SG Deputy

13

Harvard

Stevens

Sarah E. Harrington

SG Asst.

12

Harvard

Bt ki

Nicole A. Saharsky

SG Asst.

12

Minnesota

King
(5th Cir.)

Rachel P. Kovner
Brian H. Fletcher

SG Asst.
SG Asst.

12
11

Stanford
Harvard

Scalia
Ginsburg

Allon Kedem

SG Asst.

11

Yale

Kennd

Curtis E. Gannon

SG Asst.

10

Chicago

Scalia

Malcolm L. Stewart

Donald B. Verrilli, Jr

Anthony A. Yang
Jeffrey B. Wall
Noel J. Francisco
Eric J. Feigin
Ann O'Connell
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Table 5. U.S. OSG Law School and Clerkship Experience Among
Those Who Argued a Minimum of Two Times
October Terms 2013-2019
Zachary D. Tripp

SG Asst.

10

Columbia

Ginsburg

Elaine J. Goldenberg

SG Asst.

10

Harvard

LynCi .)(1st

Ilana H. Eisenstein

SG Asst.

10

Pennsylvania

Becker (3d
Cir.)

Ginger D. Anders
John F. Bash
Roman Martinez

SG Asst.
SG Asst.
SG Asst.

9
9
7

Columbia
Harvard
Yale

Ginsburg
Scalia
Roberts

Jonathan C. Bond
Jonatan

SG Asst.C.Washington
6

George

Scalia

Elizabeth B. Prelogar

SG Asst.

6

Harvard

Kagan

Jonathan Ellis
Erica L. Ross
Christopher G. Michel

SG Asst.
SG Asst.
SG Asst.

6
6
6

Pennsylvania
Stanford
Yale

Roberts
Kagan
Roberts

Morgan L. Ratner

SG Asst.

5

Harvard

Roberts

Michael R. Huston
Frederick Liu

SG Asst.
SG Asst.

5
5

Michigan
Yale

Roberts
Roberts

Sopan Joshi

SG Asst.

3

Northwestern

Scal and

Robert A. Parker
Melissa Sherry

SG Asst.
SG Asst.
SG Asst.

3
3
3

Yale

Unknown

Virginia
Virginia

Stevens
Ginsburg

Counselor

2

Boston U.

Unknown

Matthew Guarnieri

SG Asst.

2

Columbia

Unknown

Benjamin J. Horwich

SG Asst.

2

Stanford

Joseph R. Palmore
Irv Gornstein

O Aor

As discussed in Section IV.A, the OSG has long been populated by many
of the nation's best appellate lawyers coming from the top of their classes at
the most elite law schools. 240 Perched atop most other offices in Main Justice,
the OSG is an elite place to work, 24 1 not only because of the pedigrees and
abilities of those who work there but also because of the unique and special
relationship they have with the Justices. 242 The SG has often been referred to

240. See discussion supra Section IV.A.
241. See CAPLAN, supra note 127, at 3.
242. See id. at 19-32.
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as the tenth Justice. 243 These lawyers see their role as both advocates and
servants committed to helping the Court. In fact, many OSG members seem
more interested in pleasing the Justices than the President or the Attorney
General. 244 These dynamics present some interesting separation of powers

issues, but that is a topic for another day.
As described in Part IV.A, the frequent interaction between the Justices
and the lawyers in the OSG leads to mutual respect and a knowledge of each
other.245 It is heady company. They are among the few amici who can often
be seen as true "friends" of the Court. Members of the OSG have unique
access to the Court-the SG even has an office at the Court. 246 They are the
quintessential repeat players, and the Justices come to know them well, and
they knew many of them already as their former clerks.
Continuing the theme of this Article of the convergence of changes in the
appellate world, there have been notable changes in the OSG that were
documented earlier. One change worth returning is to the fact that for many
years, it was common for lawyers in the OSG either to spend their entire
careers in the office or stay there for an extended period of time.247 Now, many
serve for only a few years before leaving to enter the private sector.248 Most
lawyers in the OSG were already high-profile law clerks 249 and after serving
in the OSG, they enter the private sector with extraordinary experience arising
from more interactions with the Justices than is typical among other lawyers.
In fact, they are in even more demand than clerks coming straight from the
Supreme Court, and the fight to recruit them is intense. 2 0 Interestingly, under
the Trump Administration, more individuals are coming to the OSG from big
law finrms with significant experience. 251 Most will likely stay for a short time

before returning to the private sector, as is typical with SSGs. In sum, those
who work for the government in the OSG do not look very different from their
big law counterparts. They arrive as elites and become even more valuable to
the private sector.
243. Id. at 3.
244. Interview with Anonymous (confidential transcript on file with author); see also
CAPLAN, supra note 127, at 34-38.
245. PERRY, supra note 14, at 132.
246. Vladeck, supra note 139, at 123.
247. See Lazarus, supra note 14, at 1492; see also supra Section IV.A.2.
248. See, e.g., Tony Mauro, Solicitor General's Office Fills Ranks with Big Law Hires,
NAT'L L.J. (Aug. 30, 2017), https://www.law.com/nationallawjoumal/almID/1202796881204/

[https://perma.cc/Q64S-GFLQ].
249. Biskupic et al., supra note 13.
250. See, e.g., Sara Randazzo, CaliforniaLaw Firm Hires Former Solicitor Generalfor
Washington, D.C., Office, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 28, 2016), https://www.wsj.com/articles/califor
nia-law-firm-hires-former-solicitor-general-for-washington-d-c-office-1475089202
[https://perma.cc/NP7B-4BVZ].
251. See Mauro, supra note 248.
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C.

State Solicitors General

State SGs and AGs are beginning to look more like their federal
counterparts. Table 6 shows who argued over the seven Terms studied in this
Article. As can be seen, their pedigrees are also impressive and becoming
more elite over time. Particularly interesting is how many have clerked for
Supreme Court Justices. Elitism abounds even in state capitals.
Table 6. State SGs and AGs Arguing Before the Court
October Terms 2013-2019
Attorney

Position

Oral

Arguments

Supreme
Law School

Court

Clerkship
Scott A. Keller
Eric E. Murphy
Frederick R. Yarger
Derek L. Schmidt
Andrew L. Brasher
Noah Purcell
John J. Bursch
Steven M. Sullivan
Aaron D. Lindstrom
Jonathan F. Mitchell
David L. Franklin
Allen Winsor
Toby Crouse
Elizabeth Murrill
Robert C.
Montgomery

Ruth Botstein
Toby J. Heytens
Tyler R. Green
Jennifer Grace Miller
Joseph F. Whalen

SG Tex.
SG Ohio
SG Colo.
AG Kan.
SG Ala.
SG Wash.
SG Mich.
Asst. AG
Md.
SG Mich.
SG Tex.
SG Ill.
SG Fla.
SG Kan.
SG La.

11
4
4
3
3
3
3
3

Texas
Chicago
Chicago
Georgetown
Harvard
Harvard
Minnesota
Harvard

Kennedy
Kennedy
Unknown
Unknown
Unknown
Souter
Unknown
Unknown

2
2
2
2
2
2

Chicago
Chicago
Chicago
Florida
Kansas
LSU

Unknown
Scalia
Ginsburg
Unknown
Unknown
Unknown

Senior
Deputy AG

2

North
Carolina

Unknown

2

Stanford

Unknown

2
1
1

Virginia
Berkeley
Boston
University
Boston

Ginsburg
Unknown
Unknown

N.C.
Asst. AG
Alaska
SG Va.
SG Utah
Asst. AG
Mass.
Assoc. SG

1

Tenn.

Carolyn E. Shapiro

SG Ill.

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol72/iss1/9
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Chicago

Breyer
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Table 6. State SGs and AGs Arguing Before the Court
October Terms 2013-2019
Attorney

Michael J. Fischer

Position

Deputy AG

Oral
ral

Arguments
1

Supreme
Law School

Columbia

Court

Clerkship
Unknown

Pa.

Matthew W. Sawchak

Dep't Just.

1

Duke

Unknown

SG Ga.

1

Duke

Unknown

AG Va.
Asst. AG
Mass.
SG Wis.
AG N.Y.

1
1

George Mason
Georgetown

Unknown
Unknown

1
1

Georgetown
Georgetown

Kennedy
Unknown

Georgetown

Unknown

N.C.

Sarah Hawkins
Warren

Matthew R. McGuire
Randall E. Ravitz
Misha Tseytlin
Barbara D.
Underwood
Erin E. Murphy

Wash. State
Senate

Beth A. Burton

Deputy AG

1

Georgia

Unknown

Andrew S. Oldham

Ga.
Deputy SG

1

Harvard

Alito

Tex.
D. John Sauer

SG Mo.

1

Harvard

Unknown

Lindsay S. See

AG W. Va.

1

Harvard

Unknown

Trevor S. Cox

SG Va.

1

Harvard

Unknown

Todd Kim

SG D.C.

1

Harvard

Unknown

Ryan Park

Deputy SG
N.C.

1

Harvard

Ginsburg

Ariz. SG
Okla. SG

1
1

Harvard
Harvard

Unknown
Unknown

Carey R. Dunne

N.Y. Cnty.

1

Harvard

Unknown

Thomas M. Fisher

DA's Off.
SG Ind.

1

Indiana

Unknown

SG Kan.

1

Kansas

White

Brett E. Legne

SG Ill.

1

Loyola

Unknown

Elizabeth Murrill

SG La.

1

Asst. AG
Md.

1

Chicago
LSU
Maryland

Unknown
Unknown

Oramel H. Skinner
Mithun Mansinghani

Stephen R. McAllister

Julia Doyle Bernhardt

Published by Scholar Commons,

41

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 72, Iss. 1 [], Art. 9
[VOL. 72: 245]

SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

286

Table 6. State SGs and AGs Arguing Before the Court
October Terms 2013-2019
Attorney

Position

Oral
ral

Arguments

Supreme
Law School

Court

1

Michigan

Clerkship
Unknown

1

Michigan

Unknown

SG Wyo.
SG Colo.
Special AG
Mich.
SG Tex.

1
1
1

Michigan
Michigan
Minnesota

Unknown
Unknown
Unknown

1

Minnesota

Unknown

James D. Smith

SG Neb.

1

Nebraska

Unknown

Marcus J. Rael Jr.

AG N.M.

1

New Mexico

Unknown

S.F. Deputy

1

NYU

Souter

1

NYU

Unknown

1
1

Unknown
Unknown
Unknown

Valerie Newman

Dario Broghesan

Mich. Asst.
State Pub.
Def.
Alaska
Dep't of
Law

John G. Knepper
Eric R. Olson
John J. Bursch
Kyle D. Hawkins

Christine Van Aken

City Att'y
Daniel Rogan

Philip J. Weiser
Patrick R. Wyrick

Hennepin
Cnty. Att'y's

Off.
AG Colo.
SG Okla.

1
1

Pennsylvania

Unknown

Marty J. Jackley

DA Gen.
Idaho
Deputy DA
Phila.
AG S.D.

NYU
Oklahoma
Oregon

1

South Dakota

Unknown

Edward C. DuMont
Joshua A. Klein

SG Cal.
Cal. Dep't of

1
1

Stanford
Stanford

Unknown
Unknown

1
1
1

Stanford
Tulane
UC Hastings

Unknown
Unknown
Unknown

1

UCLA

Unknown

1

University of
San Diego

Unknown

Carl J. Withroe
Ronald Eisenberg

Just.

Michael J. Mongan
Luther J. Strange, III
Jeffrey M.K. Laurence

SG Cal.
SG Ala.
Supervising
Deputy AG

Louis W. Karlin
Mark Brnovich

Cal.
Deputy AG
Cal.
AG Ariz.

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol72/iss1/9

42

Perry: The Elitification of the U.S. Supreme Court and Appellate Lawyeri
ELITIFICATION OF THE U.S. SUPREME COURT

2020]

287

Table 6. State SGs and AGs Arguing Before the Court
October Terms 2013-2019
Attorney

Position

Oral

Arguments

Supreme
Law School

University of
San Diego
University of
San Diego

Court

Clerkship
Unknown

Mark Brnovich

AG Ariz.

1

Robin Urbanski

Deputy AG
Cal.

1

Kathryn Keena

Asst. Dakota

1

Hamline

Unknown

1

Iowa

Unknown

Asst. AG
Ky.

1

Unknown

Unknown

1

Univ. of Texas

Unknown

Dale Schowengerdt
Daniel D. Domenico
Stuart A. Raphael
Kenneth K. Jorgensen

State Senior
Asst. AG
Ark.
SG Mont.
SG Colo.
State SG Va.
SG Idaho

1
1
1
1

Unknown
Unknown
Unknown
Unknown

Bridget C. Asay
Richard P. Dearing

SG Vt.
N.Y.C. Law

1
1

Regent
Virginia
Virginia
William
Mitchell
Yale
Yale

Michael Scodro
Thomas R. Govan

SG Ill.
SG Ala.

1
1

Chicago
Unknown

Unknown
Unknown

Fed. Pub.

1

Unknown

Unknown

Unknown

Cnty, Att'y
David J. Lynch

Iowa Utils.

Bd. Gen.
Couns.
Susan R. Lenz

David A. Curran

Unknown
Unknown

Dep't

Richard M. Sununa

Def.
D.

The Justices

Though this Article concentrates on lawyers, it is well to remember that
the Justices themselves usually come from elite ranks 2 2-if not from birth,
252. William Wan, Every Supreme Court Justice Attended Harvard or Yale. That's a

Problem,
Say
Decision-Making Experts,
WASH.
POST
(July
11,
2018),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/speaking-of-science/wp/2018/07/1 1/every-supremecourt-justice-attended-harvard-or-yale-thats-a-problem-say-decision-making-experts/
[https://perna.cc/N5C7-VNVK].
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certainly by the time they become Justices. Today, all Justices come from the
most elite law schools, and most have spent their careers relatively isolated as
federal judges. 253

As with any group of elites, there are often close personal ties and
networks within. According to one journalistic account:
[W]hen [elite lawyer Ted] Olson married in 2006, Justice Kennedy

and retired Justice Sandra Day O'Connor were among the guests at
the ceremony in Napa Valley[,] California. Olson and [Justice] Scalia
regularly attend an intimate New Year's Eve dinner. Location: Justice
Ruth Bader Ginsburg's apartment at the Watergate complex. Last
year, [Justice] Kagan went too. 254
This is not to suggest anything untoward or inappropriate. Connections

like this abound in most elite circles. Social and professional relations present
potential conflicts in all aspects of government, business, and education, and
they must be negotiated. It has always been thus, but there are reasons to worry
a bit more about it now. 255 As Robert Putnam demonstrated, social networks
are getting more homogeneous, and increasingly, individuals are socializing
more with those they know-often to the exclusion of others. 256 But there is
something about the social networks of judges that is a bit disquieting when
they are friends, former bosses, or mentors of those who argue before them.
Other federal courts have policies on socializing with lawyers, but the
Supreme Court does not. 257 Justice Scalia recognized this: "[A] rule that
[would] require[] members of this [C]ourt to remove themselves from cases
in which the official action of friends were at issue would be utterly
disabling. "258
The worry is not that the Justices rule in favor of their clerks; rather, it is
the appearance of a very intimate insiders' network. What might present more
of a problem than appearances is if the Court is what Joan Biskupic and her
colleagues referred to as "an echo chamber." 259 When the Justices are
deciding cases, the arguments they are reading and hearing come from people
much like themselves-the same law schools, same social class, same social
circles, even the same experiences. They are hearing from people whom they
trained as their former clerks and mentees and from lawyers whose
experiences in the legal profession are much like their own. Echo chambers
253.
254.
255.
256.
257.
258.
259.

See id.
Biskupic et al., supra note 13.
PUTNAM, supra note 223, at 27.
Id.
Biskupic et al., supra note 13.
Id.
Id.
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abound in our society, but the concern of an echo chamber is greater for judges
than other governmental leaders because judges lead a more insular life, and
they are not as free to seek outside input or information unless it is brought to
them by a case or counsel. Of course, amici play an important role in this
regard, but amici are rarely allowed time at oral argument; so many amicus
briefs are filed, it is unclear how many are actually read by the Justices or even
by their clerks. 260 Perhaps more importantly, amici are increasingly being
orchestrated by the litigants' lawyers. 261
E.

The Justices' Views on Elitism

Whatever the potential problems of an echo chamber and elitism, the
Justices are not only not troubled by it, they are in favor of it irrespective of
their legal, ideological, or political stripe. 262 When asked about the specialized
Supreme Court bar, Justice Kagan said, "we all hope that it will
continue ... good lawyering helps for better decision-making." 263 In
describing the current Court as "the really hot bench," she suggested that
appellate specialists are almost a necessity. 264 When discussing trial lawyers
in the Supreme Court, she said they "occasionally will be really good, but
often they are not. Supreme Court specialists . .. know what kind of questions
we ask, the information we need or want." 265 Justice Kagan also said she is
troubled by the "real disparity" between the government and defense lawyers
in criminal cases, and she has mentioned this on several occasions. 266
Further, Justice Sotomayor noted that state advocacy in the Court has
improved greatly, but defense trial lawyers sometimes persist from the local
court level all the way to the Supreme Court with bad results. 267 Justice
Kennedy was quoted on this topic, showing his approval of the elite bar as
well. 268 In response to questions about an elite and specialized Supreme Court
bar, Justice Thomas said: "[T]he problem is when you have a tough case, you
need really good lawyers to tee it up, to make the best arguments. That's what

260. Lazarus, supra note 14, at 1523-24.
261. Larsen & Devins, supra note 14, at 1903.
262. See Biskupic et al., supra note 13.
263. Tony Mauro, Kagan Dishes on Supreme Court Bar, State of the Union, and Law

Schools, LEGAL TIMES (Feb. 4, 2015) (internal quotation marks omitted), http://www.national
lawjournal.com/legaltimes/id=1202716979048/Kagan-Dishes-on-Supreme-Court-Bar-Stateof-the-Union-and-Law-Schools [https://penna.cc/QU92-CZGA].
264. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
265. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
266. Id.
267. Marcia Coyle, Where Are All the Good Criminal Advocates?, 2 NAT'L L.J. 21, 21
(2018).
268. See Biskupic et al., supra note 13.
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you're looking for." 2 69 Retired Justice Stevens likewise observed, "they earn
respect by their performances. And because they have respect, they are more
successful. I'm not aware of any downside." 27 The late Justice Ginsburg also
noted: "If you know you have a solid beginning, two people making the best
argument on both sides, that makes it less anxious for you."271
Before coming to the Court, Chief Justice Roberts had a more nuanced
view. He put it this way:

Obviously better advocacy-if in fact that is what comes with more
experienced advocates-is a good thing. A well-argued case will not
necessarily be well decided; sometimes the judges get in the way. But
there is a significant risk that a poorly argued case will be poorly
decided. That is a risk of our adversary system. More experienced,
better advocates should be a good thing. 272
But he then went on to acknowledge the pitfall of elitism with the
Supreme Court bar, stating a point-of-view rarely said around the Court these
days by either Justices or active Supreme Court practitioners:
[T]here is no denying that something is lost as the bar becomes more
specialized. The Chief Justice [Rehnquist] has referred to the
"intangible value of oral argument," the point at which counsel and
Court look each other in the eye and have a public "interchange"
about the case. If you have a case arising in Iowa that works its way
through the Iowa courts, goes to the Iowa Supreme Court, and works
its way to Washington, I think there is something beneficial both for
the U.S. Supreme Court and certainly for the Iowa bar to have Iowa
attorneys present that case. That is true, of course, only to the extent
that those attorneys are able and willing to learn what practice before
the Supreme Court is like and what it demands of them.... It may be
that not many lawyers with different practices to maintain can set
aside the months necessary effectively to brief and to prepare for
argument in a case before the Supreme Court.273

269.
270.
271.
272.
273.

Id.
Id.
Id.
See Roberts, supra note 28, at 79.
Id.
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Criticismsof Elitism

Michael Luttig, who clerked for Justice Burger and for then-Judge Scalia
and who formerly served as a judge on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit, was more blunt than Chief Justice Roberts:
It has become a guild, a narrow group of elite justices and elite
counsel talking to each other. . . detached and isolated from the real
world, ultimately at the price of the healthy and proper development
of the law.274

Though not a precise analogy to the lack of diversity among the Court,
there are reasons why law schools and, even more so, university departments
rarely hire their own. Academic departments worry about hiring too many
employees from the same university. This is not because they do not want
first-rate scholars on their faculty; rather, they do not want ideas exchanged
and argued among individuals from the same place or perspective. Having

faculty from a diverse set of universities improves a school or department by
enhancing the chance of getting fresh, novel perspectives. It is also why
universities want to recruit students from all fifty states with diverse
backgrounds even if doing so might slightly lessen the median LSAT or SAT
score. All things being equal, diversity is a good thing. It is the first part of
this sentence that troubles the Justices. All things are not equal, and they want
the very best, or who they perceive to be the very best, whenever they can
have it. Of course, the Justices want high quality advocacy, and that is a good
thing. But surely having the same lawyer arguing five or six cases term after
term reduces input and perspective. It is a false choice to say that the Court
must trade quality appellate argument to have a wider range of inputs. No

great physics department, political science department, law school, or medical
school is willing to reduce the quality of its faculty simply to seek a more
diverse faculty; but they do want to assure that they are creating an
environment where fresh insights are being considered to address old and new
problems.
The consequences of an absence of such diversity is an old story. Harvard
law professor Charles Ogletree put it this way: "I think hearing different
voices, from more women and people of color would change the way the court
looked at cases and analyzed them[.]" 2 75 In a nine-year study, Reuters

274. Biskupic et al., supra note 13.
275. Id.
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identified sixty-six lawyers with the highest rate of granted petitions. 276 Of the
sixty-six, sixty-three are white, and only eight are women. 277
Though things have improved, women constitute a minute percentage of
those who argue before the Court. 278 In the 2018 Term, for example, of 184

appearances before the Court, only thirty-one were women, ten of whom were
from the OSG. 279 It is difficult to determine the race of lawyers who have
argued before the Court, but there are very few black lawyers that have ever
argued before the Court, especially after the Civil Rights movement.280 An
article in Mother Jones could only identify fewer than a half dozen black
women who argued in the Court from 1999 to 2016.281

There is, however, more information about the lack of minority
representation among Supreme Court law clerks. In a study done by the
NationalLaw Journal, from 2005 to 2017, 85% of law clerks were white.282
Of the 487 clerks, twenty were African-American and nine were Hispanic. 283
Given the pathway to the elite private bar that this Article demonstrates,
prospects for the future are not promising for more minorities to get into the
club.
There are reasons to celebrate the growth of an elite private bar. The
federal government has long had many of the best appellate lawyers in the
nation. Indeed, for a long time, the federal government had almost a monopoly
on those lawyers who had vast experience before the Court. Given the
importance of the issues that the Court decides, it may be good that a private
bar of repeat, elite players now confronts government lawyers with equal wit
and power. It is tempting to think of private elite lawyers as only representing

the rich and powerful. However, those without power have increasingly
become represented by elite lawyers before the Court. Law schools have
developed legal clinics appealing to the Supreme Court, and they are

276. Id.
277. Id.; see also MCGUIRE, supra note 10, at 35.
278. See Tony Mauro, At the Supreme Court, Where Are the Women Advocates?, NAT'L

L.J. (Oct. 2, 2019), https://www.law.com/nationallawjournal/2019/10/02/at-the-supreme-courtwhere-are-the-women-advocates/
[https://perma.cc/Z9WS-HQ99];
Kimberly Strawbridge
Robinson, An Uphill Climb for Women Supreme CourtAdvocates Gets Steeper, BLOOMBERG L.
(May 15, 2020) https://news.bloomberglaw.com/us-law-week/an-uphill-climb-for-womensupreme-court-advocates-gets-steeper [https://perma.cc/34AJ-SKG9].
279. Mauro, supra note 278; Robinson, supra note 278.
280. See, e.g., Stephanie Mencimer, A Black Woman Is Arguing a Big Supreme Court Case
Today, MOTHER JONES (Oct. 5, 2016), https://www.motherones.com/politics/2016/10/buck-vdavis-christina-swarns/ [https://perma.cc/6W6Y-9Q9K].
281. Id.
282. Tony Mauro, Shut Out: SCOTUSLaw Clerks StillMostly White andMale, NAT'L L.J.
(Dec. 22, 2017), https://www.law.com/ctlawtribune/sites/ctlawtribune/2017/12/22/shut-outscotus-law-clerks-still-mostly-white-and-male-2/ [https://perma.cc/6HYW-MLVK].
283. Id.
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represented by lawyers who themselves are repeat players. 28 4 Superstar
Thomas Goldstein, for example, helped found clinics at Harvard and
Stanford. 285 Likewise, Jeffrey Fisher, one of Justice Stevens's former clerks,
joined the program at Stanford and is himself one of the elite. 28 6
It would be a mistake to conclude that the scales are even though. As
Fisher noted: "We can only do so much." 28 7 Of the top forty-four oral
advocates in Table 1, many are known to sympathize with the less powerful
in society and have argued before the Court on their behalf 288 Moreover,
because of the prestige of arguing before the Court, many top advocates and
those seeking to become top advocates will take cases pro bono just to appear
before the Court.289 These advocates are selective in the cases they agree to
take, however, because success on their part could lead to policies that
disadvantage their major clients. 290 In fact, lawyers from two of the elite law
firms often appearing before the Court have said as much. Glen Nager, an
attorney with Jones Day, said: "We do not take cases that could make negative
law for our clients." 29 1 And Christopher Landau, formerly with Kirkland Ellis
(which represents some of the nation's largest corporations), asserted, "The
last thing we want is to make one of our long-standing clients unhappy with
what we do."
G.

292

Control over Agenda Setting

What may be as important than who argues before the Court is the
increasing power of the elite private bar in the agenda-setting process. When
analyzing the Supreme Court, most attention focuses on the Court's decision
on the merits. 293 Much less attention is given to how the case made it onto the
Court's relatively small docket. As John Kingdon said in his classic book on
agenda setting in governmental institutions:

We know more about how issues are disposed of than we know about
how they came to be issues on the governmental agenda in the first
place, how the alternatives from which decision makers chose were
284. Lazarus, supra note 14, at 1502.
285. Biskupic et al., supra note 13.
286. Id.
287. Id.
288. Lazarus, supra note 14, at 1557.
289. Id.
290. Biskupic et al., supra note 13.
291. Id.
292. Id.
293. See PERRY, supra 14, at 5-7; Feldman, supra note 14, at 430; EPSTEIN ET AL., supra
note 1, at 66.
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and some likely

alternatives never came to be the focus of serious attention. 294

Kingdon's insights are particularly relevant for the Supreme Court. Even more
so than other governmental institutions, the Court is largely dependent on
issues being brought to it. To be sure, the Court is not as constrained in setting
its agenda as the textbook model suggests; the Court has all sorts of ways to
encourage someone to bring a case to them, and it has virtually complete
discretion in selecting which cases to review. 295 Nevertheless, the parties and
their counsel play a particularly important role. Moreover, when a particular
case is chosen to resolve an issue, the way in which the case is presented often
frames the issue, providing and restricting the Court's alternatives in the
ultimate decision.
As E.E. Schattschneider famously said, "[t]he definition of the
alternatives is the supreme instrument of power." 296Accordingly, focusing on
who helps shape that agenda is particularly important:
Sometimes who counsel is . . . is important for the [J]ustices. [Some

attorneys] are known by the Court as being particularly good. When
the Court has an opportunity to pick among cases to resolve an issue,

the case with good counsel will usually be chosen. Unfortunately for
the Court, however, the ability to choose a case based on the quality
of counsel occurs only rarely. 297

Times have changed. The names of high-powered appellate attorneys are
plentiful in petitions these days, and by the Justices' own admissions, the
quality of counsel seems to matter a lot to them. 298 Who counsel is matters
positively and negatively. In fact, Justice Thomas confessed that "[a]ny
number of people will vote against a cert petition if they think the lawyering
is bad." 299 Similarly, Justice Scalia acknowledged that although he never
voted to grant certiorari solely on the basis of the quality of counsel, he had
"voted against what would be a marginally granted petition when it was not
well presented . . . where the petition demonstrate [d] that the lawyer [was] not
300
going to argue it well."
294. JOHN

W. KINGDON,

AGENDAS, ALTERNATIVES, AND PUBLIC POLICIES 1 (1984).

295. PERRY, supra 14, at 125
296. ELMER ERIC SCHATTSCHNEIDER, THE SEMISOVEREIGN PEOPLE: A REALIST'S VIEW
OF DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 68 (1960).

297. PERRY, supra note 14, at 127. This phenomenon has been referred to as "signaling."
See generally id. at 121-24 (discussing signaling).
298. See discussion supra Section V.E.
299. Biskupic et al., supra note 13.
300. Id.
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The Justices rely on all sorts of screening mechanisms to help manage the
extraordinary burden of selecting some sixty odd cases out of almost ten
thousand petitions. They and their clerks give more attention to some petitions
than others. 301 They look for certain signals. Who will serve as counsel has
become a prominent one as the Justices indicated above. Seeing the name of
the Solicitor General, Paul Clement, or Neal Katyal on a petition sends a clear
signal that it deserves closer scrutiny. The SG has always played an important
role in this process as the Court relies on the SG to help winnow cases. 30 2
Now, however, elite private attorneys are doing serious screening before they
choose to put their name on a case. 303 But as law professor Jenny Roberts
stated, "We don't want the [J]ustices to filter cases through advocates. If this
is happening, delegating the discretion of cases to sort of sub-Supreme Court
when so much is at stake is troublesome." 304 Interestingly, in the 1980s when
the Court felt the burden of having to screen so many cases in the certiorari
process, there was a serious proposal for a National Court of Appeals to screen
cases and refer them to the Court.305 The Justices would have none of this. 306
They were unwilling to delegate such authority to other federal judges. 307 It is
a bit ironic that now that function is done somewhat by private counsel.
One might argue that private lawyers serving as repeat players are not that

different from OSG lawyers who long played a role in screening judges.
However, there is a difference between the OSG screening and having private
counsel screen. There are public checks on government lawyers. 308 The

attentive public has some sense of what the priorities of the government are
in a particular Justice Department. At least in theory, when the government is
giving priority to certain concerns over others, the decision can be argued

publicly and ultimately controlled through the political process. Also, internal
arguments occur within the OSG that focus on long-term institutional

301. Lazarus, supra note 14, at 1523-24 (asserting that the reason is "entirely practical"
because neither the Justices nor clerks have the time to spend the same amount of time on all
petitions seeking review); see also PERRY, supra note 14, at 121-24.
302. Cordray & Cordray, supra note 142, at 1336; see discussion supra Section III.V.A.
303. See PERRY, supra note 14, at 128.
304. Biskupic et al., supra note 13.
305. See PERRY, supra note 14, at 264 (discussing the proposed function of the National
Court of Appeals).
306. See id. at 67 (construing Justice Brennan's opposition to the National Court of
Appeals due to the importance of case selection and that case selection is not a duty that can be
given to another court).
307. Id.
308. 28 U.S.C. § 541(a) (2012) ("The President shall appoint, by and with the advice and
consent of the Senate, a United States attorney for each judicial district."). Thus, because the
President and Congress are elected by the people, the people serve as a check to the actions of
government lawyers. Although the public cannot vote the government lawyer out, the public
may vote against the president who appointed the lawyer, or the senator who confirmed him.
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credibility. Maintaining this credibility is one of the OSG's highest priorities,
and it is generally more interested in developing doctrine in particular ways
rather than winning an individual case. 309 The same dynamic is not in play
with private counsel. Both entities may be equally competent to understand
which cases are good vehicles in jurisprudential matters, such as unclear facts
and other issues making a case problematic. 10 But for Supreme Court review,
there is more to the screening function than sifting through good and bad
cases. SGs fill a dual responsibility: they are both an advocate for their client
and a government representative required to further justice-sometimes at the
expense of their client. 31' Such a perspective is inappropriate for private
counsel.
Again, it makes sense that when the Court chooses to wrestle with a
difficult issue, it wants a highly skilled advocate. But not all clients can afford
these advocates. As Justice Ginsburg observed: "[B]usiness can pay for the
best counsel money can buy. The average citizen cannot. That's just a
reality." 312 However, there is a related but more serious problem that goes
beyond the disadvantages to individual litigants-a systematic relationship
between the types of issues that do and do not appear before the Court due to
money.
Former Director of Public Citizen Litigation Group and current law

professor, Alan Morrison, said, "It's very hard to get a consumer,
environmental or workers case up, compared to business." 313 Justices usually
do not see themselves on the bench to do justice in individual cases but rather
to resolve larger issues of law so that the rest of the judiciary can apply the
proper understanding of the law.3 14 They see cases as fungible. 315 The Court
presumes that if an issue is important, it will rise again; therefore, passing on
an individual case is no big deal.3 16 These days, when the SG is petitioning
fewer cases and the elite bar is so tiny and insular, Justices may not be as
certain that cases are so fungible and that all important issues will continue to
arise or be argued in the same way. With a smaller docket and fewer lawyers
disproportionately representing wealthy clients, these changes may not only
309. See Cordray & Cordray, supra note 142, at 1329; Lazarus, supra note 14, at 149596; H.W. Perry Jr., United States Attorneys-Whom Shall They Serve?, 61 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS., 138-39 (1998) (noting that this, incidentally, is often a source of frustration to other
lawyers in Main Justice, not to mention U.S. attorneys and other government lawyers).
310. PERRY, supranote 14, at 234-36.
311. See Cordray & Cordray, supra note 142, at 1381-82 (noting the decreased number of
cases for which the OSG is seeking certiorari).
312. Biskupic et al., supra note 13.
313. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
314. PERRY, supranote 14, at 220.
315. Id. at 220-21 (highlighting that it is the issue that the case raises, not the specific case
itself, that is important (emphasis added)).
316. Id. at 221.
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affect individual litigants but also the nature of the agenda more generally.
Whether the existence of a very small group of elite counsel has skewed
outcomes in either agenda setting or the direction of the law is up for debate,
and it deserves more systematic analysis.
H. Elitism and Democracy
No one seems to doubt the elitification of the Court, and the Justices, in
fact, see it as laudable. Scholars who study elites undoubtedly could raise
many more problems that typically arise when relatively small and powerful
elites control access to an institution-no matter how honorable those elites
are. The effects and normative conclusions are likely debatable but
understanding the elitification of appellate courts is surely worth documenting
and worthy of more systematic and empirical study by social scientists, legal
scholars, and others.
In a democratic society and regime, there are particular reasons to be
concerned about the concentration of power in elites, especially when
governing institutions become dominated by elites and access to those
institutions is increasingly controlled by them. Sociologists and political
scientists have long paid attention to the roles and importance of elites. 317 In
1956, C. Wright Mills published his influential book The Power Elite and
demonstrated how different elites came to play roles of dominance. 318 More
recently, a leading scholar on elites, G. William Domhoff, demonstrated how
elites working in various ways can control important issues in policy making
despite democratic elections. 319 In 2014, Martin Gilens and Benjamin Page

empirically tested four theoretical traditions in the study of American
politics. 320 Their multivariate analysis "indicates that economic elites and
organized groups representing business interests have substantial independent
impacts on U.S. government policy, while average citizens and mass-based
interest groups have little or no independent influence." 32 1 There is no reason
to believe ex ante that these concerns about elites would not be true for legal
institutions.

317. See, e.g., C. WRIGHT MILLS, THE POWER ELITE (1956); G. WILLIAM DOMHOFF,
WHO RULES AMERICA? POWER AND POLITICS, AND SOCIAL CHANGE (5th ed. 2006).

318. MILLS, supranote 317, at 28.
319. See DOMHOFF, supra note 317, at 111-12.
320. Martin Gilens & Benjamin I. Page, Testing Theories of American Politics: Elites,
Interest Groups, andAverage Citizens, 12 PERSPS. ON POL. 564, 564 (2014).
321. Id.
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VI. ELITE LEGAL MOBILIZATION

[B]oth the policy preferences of judges and the meaning of
constitutional rights are partly constituted by the political economy

of appellate litigation, particularly the distribution of resources
necessaryfor sustained constitutionallitigation.322

CharlesR. Epp

[T]he judiciary may be the most important instrument for social,
economic andpolitical change.... This is a vast area of opportunity
for the Chamber, if it is willing to undertake the role of spokesman
for American business .... the Chamber would need a highly
competent staff of lawyers. In special situations it should be
authorized to engage, to appear as counsel amicus in the Supreme
Court, lawyers ofnationalstanding andreputation. The greatestcare
should be exercised in selecting the cases in which to participate, or
the suits to institute. But the opportunity merits the necessary
effort. 323

Lewis Powell (futureJustice Powell)

Igo to the office. I sue the federalgovernment. And then Igo home.324
FormerTexas Attorney General Greg Abbott

322. CHARLES R. EPP, THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION: LAWYERS, ACTIVISTS, & SUPREME
COURTS IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 5 (1998).

323. Memorandum from Lewis F. Powell Jr., to Eugene B. Sydnor Jr., Chairman of the
Educ. Comm., U.S. Chamber of Com. (Aug. 23, 1971) [hereinafter Powell Memo]
https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1000&context-powellme
mo [https://perna.cc/UFL4-4DWH]).
324. Manny Fernandez, Texas Attorney General to New Yorkers: Come on Down, with

Guns, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 20, 2013) http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/21/us/texas-attomeygeneral-invites-new-yorkers-to-bring-their-guns.html [https://penna.cc/4MQW-X6V2].
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For some time, scholars have understood the importance of the idea of
legal mobilization. 325 In a classic piece, Fran Zemans accused political
scientists of viewing law too narrowly and presented a more interactive
view. 3 26 She saw legal mobilization as invoking legal norms as a form of

political activity. 327 Michael McCann later emphasized the importance and
politics of legal mobilization in his examination of worker's rights.3 28 Susan
Lawrence also wrote about the needs for the poor in court and the importance
of the legal services corporation for legal mobilization. 329 Charles Epp
examined the concept of legal mobilization in detail, both theoretically and
cross-nationally.330 The list goes on.
Legal mobilization is usually thought of as a tool possessed by the
relatively powerless to use the law for change.33 ' Now, legal mobilization is
increasingly used by the powerful-governments and wealthy business
interests.33 2 To be sure, the rich and powerful have always used law to achieve
their ends, but the coordination implied by the concept of legal mobilization
gives it a different twist. Justice Powell's quotation above from when he was
a private lawyer suggests that the idea for business interests to mobilize legally
came relatively late.333 Attorney General (now governor) Abbott is quite blunt
in how he sought to use litigation to achieve political ends, which was usually
not done on behalf of the poor and politically powerless. The less powerful
still legally mobilize, but these days, the judiciary is increasingly less
hospitable to many of their causes,33 4 thereby making legal mobilization a less
valuable strategy. This is, in part, a function of ideological predispositions of
325. In his early reflections on American politics and highlighting the importance of legal
mobilization, Tocqueville famously observed "[s]carcely any political question arises in the
United States that is not resolved, sooner or later, into a judicial question." Frances Kahn
Zemans, Legal Mobilization: The Neglected Role of the Law in the PoliticalSystem, 77 AM.
POL. SCI. REV. 690, 690 (1983) (internal quotation marks omitted). "Political participation is
implied in the very notion of democracy." Id. at 692.
326. Id. at 690.
327. Id.
328. See generally MICHAEL W. MCCANN, RIGHTS AT WORK: PAY EQUITY REFORM AND
THE POLITICS OF LEGAL MOBILIZATION 9 (1994).
329. See generally SUSAN E. LAWRENCE, THE POOR IN COURT: THE LEGAL SERVICES
PROGRAM AND SUPREME COURT DECISION MAKING 3-15 (1990).

330. See generallyEPP, supra note 322, 14-15.
331. Zemans, supra note 325, at 700 ("The law is thus mobilized when a desire or want is
translated into a demand as an assertion of one's rights.").
332. See, e.g., supra notes 150-152 and accompanying text (discussing governmental
mobilization efforts through the use of amicus briefs); see also Rosen, supra note 109
(discussing business mobilization efforts by the Chamber of Commerce through lobbying and
the filing of amicus briefs).
333. Powell Memo, supra note 323 (asserting that American businesses are "under broad
attack" and noting that "the hour is late"); see also Rosen supra note 109 (analyzing the Memo
and its effects on business mobilization).
334. Rosen, supra note 109.
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the judges. But there are increasing difficulties brought about by things such
as stricter requirements for standing, more difficult certification for class
actions, or the sheer cost of litigation.33 5 For now, the best use of time and
money for the less powerful may be to focus elsewhere. 336 That debate aside,
it is worth thinking about legal mobilization occurring in the private bar and
by government lawyers.
A.

Mobilization Within the Private Bar

Justice Powell's memo to the Chamber of Commerce demonstrates a
conscious effort to mobilize the business community. Using legal argument
to achieve preferred outcomes for business (or any other interest) is not new
or problematic. 337 What is noteworthy, though, are the increased efforts at
coordination for appellate advocacy.338 Few would doubt that over the past
decade, the Court has been a business-friendly Court.339 The U.S. Chamber of
Commerce "was on the winning side in thirteen out of fifteen cases in which
it filed amicus briefs in [OT] 2007."340 Moreover, the Court has ruled in favor
of business interests on many issues-ranging from punitive awards to
standing-and even the liberals on the Court are relatively pro-business. 341
There are some, however, who argue that the claim of pro-business is
overstated. 342 The question is one of correlation versus causation. Probusiness outcomes can be explained simply by the Justices' identities and
philosophies, having little to do with powerful counsel and law firms. On the
other hand, perhaps elite private counsel have been very effective in efforts to
set the agenda and bring the right cases (and avoid bringing the wrong cases).
In any event, the arguments in this Article suggest this question deserves
further systematic study.

The private bar will always have incentives to pay attention to individual
cases because the rewards can be high. However, with so few legal advocates
from so few firs doing most of the work at the Supreme Court, the elite
private bar has become more able to handpick cases with the best potential to
come before the Court, win, and move the law in a particular direction. Having
335. The literatures on the increased difficulty of certifying a class or increased barriers to
standing as well as other procedural barriers are extensive. See, e.g., Behrend v. Comcast Corp.,
569 U.S. 27, 28 (2013); Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 367 (2011).
336. See GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT
SOCIAL CHANGE? (2d ed. 2008).

337. For discussion on how interest groups have implemented legal mobilization to
achieve favorable outcomes, see sources cited supra notes 325-331.
338. See Lazarus, supra note 14, at 1499-1500; Larsen & Devins supra note 14, at 1915.
339. Hungar & Jindal, supra note 101, at 527.
340. Id. at 528.
341. Lazarus, supra note 14, at 1526-27, 1534-35; Rosen, supra note 109.
342. See Hungar & Jindal, supra note 101, at 528 n.80.
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a small, elite set of appellate attorneys playing such important roles provides
more opportunity for them to engage in longer term strategies. They have the

"political economy" as described in the Epp quotation above, "particularly the
distribution of resources necessary for sustained constitutional litigation." 3 43
In the Supreme Court, the task often involves turning the law in such a
way that will benefit some and hurt others. It is not just about the powerful
versus the less powerful. The contenders may be corporations versus
entrepreneurs or powerful industries fighting over aspects of the Internet. For
this, the Court needs a wide range of input. In theory, this is what amici should
provide, and at times they do; but usually, it is the particular case and the way
the case is framed by the parties that matters most.344 Just because a lawyer is

a great advocate does not guarantee the type of input Justices need to hear.
Scholars need to understand better the underlying dynamics of legal
mobilization in the private bar-within firms and between firms. Scholars also
need to understand better the effect of having the same lawyers continuously
framing issues, not only because of their personal beliefs but also because of
underlying systemic concerns driving the legal market.
B.

Mobilization Within and Among State Governments

One relatively new form of legal mobilization is coming not from society
but from governments. Normally, society perceives governmental entities as

having legal power rather than needing to mobilize. 345 However, the SG has
long engaged in legal mobilization to achieve its long-term goals.3 46 It has
extraordinary power to marshal resources, stimulate amici, be they private or
state governments, and it is very savvy about strategies about bringing cases

to the Court. 347 That story is well known. However as demonstrated above,
state solicitors general are now involved in legal mobilization at the appellate
level. Like the U.S. OSG, the new structure of an SSG allow them to better
control appellate litigation within their state whether it is going to state or
federal court. Coordination among state governments on legal strategy is
becoming more common. 348 This is true in terms of working with states on
343. EPP, supra note 322, at 5.
344. Lazarus, supra note 14, at 1523.
345. See Cordray & Cordray, supra note 142, at 1323 (noting that the federal government
used to have more control over the judiciary's agenda setting).
346. Id. at 1324; see also supra Section IV.A.1 (discussing the SG's role in governmental
mobilization efforts through the use of amicus briefs).
347. Cordray & Cordray, supra note 142, at 1324.
348. See Greg Goelzhauser & Nicole Vouvalis, State Coordinating Institutions and
Agenda Setting on the U.S. Supreme Court, 41 AM. POLS. RSCH. 819, 819 (2013) (noting that
state coordination occurs internally when states file amicus briefs and externally through the
creation of SSG offices).
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federalism issues, torts and liability actions, and other ventures. Others have
written impressively on this topic.349 Also as discussed in Part IV.B, they are
mobilizing as red states and blue states. Many of the things that Charles Epp
argues are necessary for mobilization by the less powerful are also necessary
for the states, albeit easier for states to obtain.3 50 For example, Epp referenced
the importance and necessity of a support structure in order for legal
mobilization to occur.351 He particularly focused on material resources,
stating:
The pressure consisted of deliberate, strategic organizing . . . and
sources
of
financing,
particularly
government-supported
financing ... [c]ooperative efforts among many rights advocates,

rely on resources for rights litigation-financing, organizational
support, and willing and able lawyers-provided the raw material for
the rights revolution." 352
Epp went on to say that the logic behind the support structure explanation

depends on widespread and sustained litigation. 353 States already possess the
tools that Epp claims are necessary for legal mobilization, and as they
coordinate, states are able to have widespread and sustained litigation. 354
States have vast resources to sustain continued litigation if they so choosewitness Greg Abbot's quotation in the epigraph that begins Part VI. More

importantly, however, states are coordinating with each other by bringing
suits and writing amicus briefs at unprecedented levels. 355 This coordination
at the appellate level is largely happening through the relatively new SSG
structures.

Legal mobilization is aided by NAAG and Democratic and Republican
Attorneys General Associations. 356 NAAG helps facilitate information
sharing among states. 357 Like-minded SSGs are advising each other on
lawsuits, and states actively seek other states either to join them on amicus

349. See NOLETTE, supra note 179, at 41; Lemos & Young, supra note 179, at 46.
350. See generally EPP, supra note 322, at 11-70 (discussing that many factors in the
United States allow the states to mobilize, such as the Constitutional structure, judicial structure,
and social policy).
351. Id. at 2-5.
352. Id.
353. See id. at 11-30.
354. Id.
355. See Goelzhauser & Vouvalis, supra note 348, at 819.
356. See discussion supra Section IV.B.
357. See NAAG Centerfor Supreme CourtAdvocacy, supra note 181.
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briefs or write briefs of their own. 358 The U.S. Supreme Court has even begun
"calling for the views" of SSGs, 359 a phenomenon likely to increase in the
coming years.

In short, given the increasingly sophisticated nature of SSGs, they are
becoming a much more potent force to engage in effective mobilization. As
discussed in Section IV.B and by other scholars, sometimes the causes are
ones that affect states as states, 360 and other causes are ones ideological in
nature-think abortion restrictions-such that conservative states seek out
compatriots and liberal states do the same. 36' As discussed above, I
interviewed various SSGs, who reported that those with a conservative agenda
took advantage of the coordination and legally mobilized earlier than did their
liberal counterparts; now, it is occurring on both sides. In sum, elite groups of
government lawyers of one persuasion or the other are mobilizing through
SSGs for change at the Supreme Court level (as well as at the trial and appeals
court levels). This phenomenon is often being driven by an increased attention
to, and the improved capability of, state appellate advocacy.
VII. CONCLUSION
Dramatic changes have occurred and are continuing to occur in appellate

advocacy. At first blush, focus on lawyering and changes in appellate
advocacy can seem rather esoteric. Esoteric they may be, but inconsequential
they are not. These changes have occurred and are occurring in different
contexts: oral advocacy in the U.S. Supreme Court, the private appellate bar,
the Office of the U.S. Solicitor General, the rise of state solicitors general, and
appellate legal mobilization. These changes are important in and of
themselves, but their convergence gives them heightened importance. They

reinforce each other in many ways and are catalytic. One result is the
elitification of the Supreme Court and appellate advocacy more generally.
This elitification is certainly deserving of notice, analysis, and further study.
Appellate advocacy has always played a crucial role in shaping American
jurisprudence. Appellate lawyers' arguments frame the issues of a case, and
their arguments are often the ones that judges or Justices adopt, not only to
justify the outcome in a particular case but also to establish doctrine for future
cases. Such doctrines are obviously important for the law, but they also
358. Goelzhauser &Vouvalis, supra note 348, at 819; Dan Schweitzer, The Modern
History ofState Attorneys Arguing as Amici Curiae in the U.S. Supreme Court, 22 GREEN BAG

2D 143, 144 (2019).
359. Corday & Corday, supra note 142, at 1331-32 nn.40-41.
360. See NOLETTE, supra note 179, at 28, 41-42; Lemos & Young, supra note 179, at 91;

H.W.

PERRY JR., THE RISE AND IMPORTANCE OF STATE SOLICITORS GENERAL 8 (2011)

(arguing there are similar issues across states).
361. See NOLETTE, supra note 179, at 28, 41-42; Lemos & Young, supra note 179, at 91.
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determine the authoritative allocation of values in our society-who gets what
when and how. Sometimes cases and the importance of legal tests are
monumental and obvious: separate but equal is unequal;3 62 one person one
vote; 363 money is speech;3 64 dignity is a part of liberty and equal protection. 365
Other times, the changes in legal tests and doctrine may be subtle and go
relatively unnoticed in society outside of the legal profession; but they are
powerful nonetheless. What determines a constitutional versus prudential rule
of standing? 366 What are the rules for certifying a class action?3 67 What are
the limits on punitive damages? 3 68 When are lawsuits in states preempted?3 69

Justice Frankfurter, when he was Professor Frankfurter, spoke about the
importance of procedure. One could substitute the words appellate advocacy
for procedure and it would be equally true.
The role of procedure [appellate advocacy] in the evolution and
activity of political institutions has been little heeded by political
scientists . . . the formalities and modes of doing business, which we

characterize as procedure [appellate advocacy], though lacking in
dramatic manifestations, may, like the subtle creeping of the tide, be
a powerful force in dynamic process of government. . . .370

The elitification of the Supreme Court and appellate advocacy seems only
likely to increase. Be it for good or ill, or maybe a bit of both, it matters.

362. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) (concluding that the concept of
separate but equal is inherently unequal).
363. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Simms, 377 U.S. 533, 563 (1964); Bakerv. Carr, 369 U.S. 186,
242 (1962).
364. See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 558 U.S. 310, 339 (2010).
365. See, e.g., United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744, 775 (2013).
366. See Lexmark Int'l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, 572 U.S. 118, 125-29 (2014).
367. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 348 (2011).
368. See, e.g., State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 425 (2003).
369. See, e.g., AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 352 (2011) (holding that the
Federal Arbitration Act of 1925 preempts state laws that prohibit contracts from disallowing
class-action lawsuits).
370. FELIX FRANKFURTER & JAMES LANDIS, THE BUSINESS OF THE
STUDY IN THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL SYSTEM, at vi-vii (1928).
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